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The thesis comprises three essays on corporate financial risk management. In
particular, it studies theoretically and empirically the determinants of the firm–level
financial hedging in distinct market conditions, as well as with various managerial
compensation schemes.
In Chapter 2, we re-examine the conventional models of corporate hedging
in the presence of external financing frictions and asymmetric information on asset
value. We emphasize that in the presence of external financing needs and information
asymmetry issues, a firm should consider both the value- and information-enhancing
aspects of hedging. With market learning, firms with an under-estimated profitability
would have more incentive for hedging, especially when they obtain favorable prof-
itability shocks or in a market boom. Hedging is more sensitive to the profitability
shocks than predicted by the complete information models, and is more sensitive to
the market belief when the firm realizes an unfavorable profitability shock. The re-
sults also provide a possible explanation on the mixed empirical evidence on corporate
hedging policies.
Chapter 3 reconciles the conventional theories and mixed evidence of corpo-
rate incentives for hedging in the presence of growth options and external financing
frictions using recent oil and gas firms data. My theoretical model makes testable
predictions for the following empirical regressions. Using panel data for commodity
price hedging, I show that hedging decision positively relates to the asset’s profitabil-
ity, the severity of information asymmetry, and the potential of expansion due to
the prospective growth opportunities, and negatively relates to the inherent hedging
costs. Further, I find decreasing marginal effects of informational asymmetry and
growth potential on hedging decision.
In Chapter 4, I theoretically explore the association between managerial com-
pensation scheme for derivative earnings and the alignment of interests of firm man-
agers and outside investors. I find that, as investors treat the derivative gains as a
measure of a manager’s financial skill, there is an effective conflict between managers
and shareholders in respect of determining corporate financial hedging policy. I find a
V-shape of contracting efficiency against the price of firm product and the price of the
underlying asset of hedging derivatives. I conclude that cash compensation for prof-
itable derivatives is the key distorting the manager’s objective, under the fair-value




Financial risk management has been one of the most important corporate objectives.
This doctoral thesis comprises of three essays on the topic of corporate financial risk
management. Chapter 2 studies the corporate incentives for financial hedging with
costly external financing and asymmetric information between the controller of the
company and the outside investors. We reconcile some seemingly contrasting notions
in the conventional theoretical models regarding how the optimal risk management
strategies can be designed. Chapter 3 constructs a model in a two–period framework
and makes predictions that have empirical implications on corporate financial hedging
strategies. Next, by using hand–collected data, I examine the empirical implications
of the model and find evidence on how firm characteristics affect hedging policies.
Chapter 4 proposes a calibrated model to analyze the association between managerial
compensation scheme and corporate risk management decisions, under the fair value
accounting standards for financial derivatives.
The rationale for my research leans on the philosophy that pricing corporate
financial claims is crucially depended on the variability in the cash flows generated
by assets in place. In a hypothetical frictionless market in which Modigliani–Miller
Theorem applies, managing financial risk cannot add values to the asset, since a
company can always return to the capital market and raise cost-less funds by issuing
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new securities when receiving an adverse shock to its cash flows.1 However, as market
frictions are inevitable in practice, returning to the capital market cannot ensure the
company raises enough liquidity without any sunk costs. Consequently, the shortage
of cash could actually end up depriving the assets of the company from the liquidity
it needs to finance ongoing business or start new projects. Hence, as ongoing entities,
companies are concerned that they may in the future be deprived of the funds that
facilitate expansion projects, strengthen existing investments, or simply stay alive.
Therefore, calculating the likelihood and evaluating the consequence of each type of
events that may impact on cash flows enable the stakeholders of the company to take
advantage of the most probable risks. Thus, corporate financial risk management can
protect the interests of stakeholders through specific measures to control risks.
In this doctoral thesis, corporate financial risk management is mainly referred
to as derivatives hedging, though, companies may have various methods to manage
the financial risks exposed to their operations.2 Early survey papers found evidence
on corporate usage of financial instruments for hedging. For instance, as Rawls III and
Smithson (1990) suggest, the increased volatility of exchange rates and interest rates
in the 1970s put many companies out of business and led them to seriously recognize
their risk exposures. The survey shows that a majority of corporate management has
been forced to pay attention to the potential effect of the volatility in, say, interest
rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices, on the value of the firm.
Corporate financial hedging policies are, in principle, determined by external
and internal frictions. As in the prior literature, companies have (at least) the follow-
ing incentives for using financial instruments to hedge exogenous risks, as a result of
market imperfections. First, to reduce the frequency of costly external financing, as
in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). Second, to mitigate information asymmetry
1See Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and textbooks such as Tirole (2010).
2Gamba and Triantis (2014) explore the complex interactions among various risk management
strategies.
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in cash flows, as in DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995). Third, to reduce the convex
taxation and bankruptcy costs, as suggested by Smith and Stulz (1985). Fourth, to
reduce borrowing costs, as in Leland (1998). Fifth, as analyzed by Purnanandam
(2008), to reduce potential financial distress costs. Sixth, to reduce contracting costs,
such as with creditors, suppliers, and customers, as in Bessembinder (1991). Last but
not least, the managerial motivations for revealing latent labour qualities, as modeled
in Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) and empirically examined by Tufano (1996).
Chapter 2 focuses on the first two motives for hedging, although other motives
could be easily accommodated by extending the model. In particular, we re-examine
the conventional models of corporate hedging in the presence of external financing
frictions and asymmetric information on firm’s profitability to reconcile some seem-
ingly contrasting notions regarding the hedging incentives. Our research contributes
to the literature on corporate incentives for financial hedging.
We develop a discrete–time dynamic framework in which a firm has a growth
option that can be exercized subject to financing constraints in each period. If the
reserved cash is insufficient to finance the investment, the firm must raise external
capital to cover the funding gap. We assume that the external capital is costly,
and that the firm’s hedging decisions endogenize the likelihood of tapping external
capital and the per–unit cost of flotation through influencing outsiders’ belief on the
firm’s profitability. Because an exogenous risk factor makes the firm’s cash flow noisy,
outside investors cannot directly observe the profitability and deduce the quality of
the firm if the risk is unhedged. Thus, in each period, outsiders must update their
belief on the firm’s profitability through the observed cash flow and hedging decisions.
Methodologically, our theory belongs to the growing literature on dynamic corporate
risk management and real investment. However, unlike a full information setting, our
model provides a rationale for why and when firms will undertake hedging activities
in an imperfect capital market with asymmetric information.
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We show that optimal hedging trades off the benefits of less–frequent and less–
costly external financing with a better ability to finance investment. Before induce
the general dynamic model, we firstly propose a simple two–period model which
shows that, in equilibrium, hedging could not be a costly signal of the firm’s quality.
The general dynamic model further makes some testable predictions that may have
empirical implications. First, firms with an under–estimated profitability would have
more incentive for hedging, especially when they obtain favorable profitability shocks,
or in the boom market states, and vice versa. Second, corporate hedging policies are
more sensitive to the profitability shocks and market states than the one predicted
by the complete information models. Third, hedging is more sensitive to the belief of
outsiders when the firm realizes an unfavorable profitability shock. The results of our
dynamic model emphasize the importance of information asymmetry on corporate
incentives for financial hedging and provide a possible explanation on the mixed
empirical evidence on corporate hedging policies.
In Chapter 3, I develop and test a theory of corporate risk management in the
presence of growth options and external financing frictions. To make testable model
predictions, I propose a two–period model in which a firm with a growth option can
hedge its exogenous risk by using financial instruments. The model is in line with the
simple model in Chapter 3 but instead of solving a signalling game model, I assume
that the controller of the firm share identical information set with the outside investors
at the starting point. In words, the insider and outsiders have the same expectation
on the future uncertainties. I also abstract from managerial agency issues, which are
inessential to my argument in this chapter.
By numerically solving the model, I make some predictions that may have
empirical implications. Specifically, the model shows that hedging incentives increase
with the ability of generating cash flows of the firm, the severity of informational
asymmetry problem, and potential expansion opportunity, respectively. In contrast,
4
the costs imposed on the firm by hedging activities, e.g. opportunity cost of forgoing
upside gains, reduces the firm’s hedging incentive.
Based on the model predictions, I empirically test corporate hedging in the
presence of growth options and external financing frictions by using recent oil and
gas firms data. I perform a sample of hand-collected data comprising 62 oil and gas
firms in the United States from 2009 through 2018. The data sample contains 557
firm–year observations. I use the nominal amount of hedging in my definition of a
continuous dependent hedging variable. Specifically, I hand collect information on the
volume of crude oil and equivalence products hedged by financial derivatives, and scale
the hedged volume by the firm’s production volume in the same year to construct
hedge ratio. I supplement the financial hedging data with accounting information
from Compustat and CRSP databases. The panel structure of the data allows me
to exploit both cross–sectional and within-firm variation to assess the relationship
between financial hedging and the focused variables. Many previous studies use only
cross-sectional data and hardly exploit within–firm variation because they largely rely
on dummy variables for financial hedging activities that have only limited within–firm
variation. From the regressions of the essay, I find evidence that supports my model
predictions.
Chapter 4 explores how managerial rent influences corporate hedging policy
under current fair value based accounting standards for derivatives. In particular, I
theoretically analyze how a compensation scheme for gains from derivatives impacts
contracting efficiency. The contracting efficiency is defined as the alignment of the
interests of risk manager and shareholders. In practice, a corporate risk manager is
usually a multi–disciplinary professional with an understanding of internal business
processes and financial instruments. She performs practices to prevent loss exposure
through internal controls and financial hedging activities.
The motivation of this work is from the association between reward scheme
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for profitable derivatives and agency conflict. The aim of my research is mainly to
analyze the effect of the managerial compensation mechanism on hedging policy and
on any stakeholder’s interests. Previous researches using dynamic models mainly
focus on the rationale of managing risk and optimal hedging strategy,3 but a few of
them have analyzed the managerial incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging
ratio for shareholders. Researches discussing agency problems, like DeMarzo and
Duffie (1995) compare different levels of transparency of information, but do not
well fit current compensation scheme used by most firms. The authors propose a
model with a perfect separation of ownership and control, in which manager acts
like a normal employee. In practice, however, top managers can usually act both as
an executive and a member of the board of directors, which means managerial rent
generally comprises both cash-based and equity-based compensations.
The basic assumption of Chapter 4 builds on the empirical evidence provided by
empirical studies that firms reward their risk managers for profitable derivatives, such
as in Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2010), Livne, Markarian, and Milne (2011),
and Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016). In their studies, the performance of
derivatives is directly observed from the separate account of hedging activity required
by the current fair-value based accounting standards. Some of my results are in line
with the conclusion of Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016) that reward for
gains from derivatives can reduce contracting efficiency.
The dynamic model in Chapter 4 continues a line of Gamba and Triantis (2014).
I consider an unlevered firm (the firm) in absence of taxation with the separation of
ownership and control in my model. I use a discrete-time infinite-horizon framework
to model the operating process, hedging decisions, and payout policy of a firm. Any
cash flows of the firm are obtained at the end of each period when the state is observed.
The firm’s manager (the manager) holds a fixed fraction of claim on the firm’s cash
3See Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011), Gamba and Triantis (2014), Rampini and Viswanathan
(2010), and Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), for example.
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flow. In practice, a firm may be able to design in a higher managerial equity holding
in order to strengthen the manager’s incentives or a lower managerial equity holding
to increase access to capital. The manager is, however, maximizing the present value
of his compensation package. Please note that I do not derive any form of an optimal
career contract, but instead, approximate a contract that practitioners use and that
may or may not be optimal. Hence, I do not consider any information asymmetry or
signaling problems in my model.
The results of the essay show that, as investors treat the derivative performance
as a measure of firm manager’s financial skill, there is an effective conflict between
firm manager and shareholders in respect of determining corporate financial hedging
policy. I find a V–shaped relation of contracting efficiency against the price of firm
product and the price of the underlying asset of hedging derivatives. Because the cash
compensation for profitable derivatives is the key factor distorts the manager’s objec-
tive function, I conclude that the conflict is essentially caused by such a managerial
incentive scheme under the fair value based accounting standards for hedge.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and contributions
of this doctoral thesis, and discusses future potential research questions.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Incentive for Financial
Hedging with Costly Financing
and Informational Asymmetry
2.1. Introduction
We re–examine the conventional models of corporate hedging in the presence of exter-
nal financing frictions and asymmetric information on firm’s profitability to reconcile
some seemingly contrasting notions regarding the hedging incentives.
First, since Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) the prevailing literature shows
that hedging can help a firm avoid costly external financing, by making its cash flows
less volatile. Hence, by hedging a firm can finance the investment opportunities using
less costly internal resources, or can invest more, ultimately increasing its value. The
value effect of hedging has been examined empirically (e.g., MacKay and Moeller,
2007 and Pérez-González and Yun, 2013), but results are mixed. At the very best,
the value effect of financial derivatives is modest, as evidenced by Guay and Kothari
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(2003), among others. While these inconclusive results may be due to empirical
challenges, it may be also the case that hedging is not value-increasing. For instance,
Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017) argue that if a firm’s growth opportunities are
positively correlated with the cash flows and the prospects are good, hedging actually
jeopardizes the potential of expansion by eliminating the chance of high cash flows.
In this case, hedging reduces the value of the growth options and of the firm. More
generally, firms using financial derivatives normally incur various endogenous costs
(such as transaction costs, negotiation costs, etc.) related to hedging activities, which
offset its benefit (see for instance, Gamba and Triantis, 2014). Hence, there is a case
for a more thorough re-examination of hedging as a way to create value.
Second, hedging can have a direct effect on external financing costs by alle-
viating adverse selection issues. A consequence of informational asymmetry is that
outside investors require a discount when they buy newly issued securities when firms
raise external funds, as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984). Antunovich (1996) fur-
ther argues that firms with higher informational asymmetries have greater dispersion
of slack due to their difficulties accessing capital markets.1 In this aspect, firms can
hedge to make their business more transparent, ultimately reducing the underpricing
cost of information sensitive securities, like equity. More precisely, by reducing the
amount of noise, hedging increases the informativeness of cash flow realizations for
outside investors, who can thereby make a more accurate inference on the value of the
firm. Hence, adverse selection costs for seasoned equity issuance will be lowered when
the firm taps the capital markets. However, also in this respect hedging may have a
drawback. As illustrated by DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), by eliminating a source of
noise, hedging makes cash flows more informative and the public perception of a firm’s
value more sensitive to its performance. Holding fixed the variability of cash flows,
this implies that financing costs may become more variable. As they are typically
1Opler and Titman (1994) empirically find that firms with more research and development (R&D)
expenses expect higher financial distress, since R&D expenses are a form of investment where infor-
mational asymmetry is most important.
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convex, this increases their present value, negatively affecting the value of the firm.
Overall, this result in a negative incentive to hedging. In addition, as suggested by
Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), firms with bad news or low–quality projects might
prefer to increase risk exposure and hope for a lucky draw. In that case, revealing
the true quality makes low–quality firms worse–off. In sum, asymmetric information
is not per se an obvious hedging motive.
As Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017), we propose a model of a firm with a
growth option, which is exercised subject to financing constraints. If the reserved cash
is insufficient to finance the investment, the firm must raise external capital to cover
the funding gap. Because an exogenous risk factor makes the firm’s cash flow noisy,
outside investors cannot directly observe the profitability and deduce the quality of
the firm if the risk is unhedged. In our model, in line with Wilson (1980), investors are
assumed to be risk-neutral with respect to the firm’s profitability. It is exactly when
the profitability is high (and investment likely), that the firm will be most exposed to
the undervaluation costs triggered by security issuance. Hence, it is key that a high-
quality firm makes sure that its profitability is correctly understood by the market,
and that the exposure to the exogenous risk is managed. Hedging is inherently costly
because it requires part of the resources used to finance the investment, in line with
Rampini and Viswanathan (2010). In this respect, the opportunity cost of hedging is
higher for a high–quality firm. In addition, in some states, hedging would lower the
value of the growth option as described above, which in turn has a negative impact
on the hedging incentive. Unlike a full information setting, our model thus provides
a rationale for why and when firms will undertake hedging activities in an imperfect
capital market with asymmetric information. In this respect, our model is closely
related to DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), although
differently from them we do not need to discuss the firm’s reputation concerns.
We show that, when making hedging decisions, the firm should consider the
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perspective on its profitability, the severity of informational asymmetry, the per-
spective of its growth opportunity, and all inevitable (opportunity) costs caused by
hedging. Optimal hedging trades off the benefits of less–frequent and less–costly ex-
ternal financing with a better ability to finance investment. Consequently, while it
can be achieved, perfect hedging (i.e. elimination) of the exogenous risk is usually not
optimal. Through a simple two–period model, we show that, without learning, firms
could not influence market belief or alter the price of external financing by optimizing
their hedge ratios. It thus provides some necessary intuitions for the assumptions of
the dynamic model.
Our dynamic model, which proposes the outsiders’ learning process, allows to
make some testable predictions. First, firms with an under–estimated profitability
would have more incentive for hedging, especially when they obtain favorable prof-
itability shocks, or in the boom market states, and vice versa. Second, corporate
hedging policies are more sensitive to profitability shocks and market states than pre-
dicted by the complete information models. Third, hedging is more sensitive to the
belief of outsiders when the firm realizes an unfavorable profitability shock, or when
the market is in recession. The results of our dynamic model emphasize the impor-
tance of information asymmetry on the incentives to hedge and provide a possible
explanation on the mixed empirical evidence on corporate hedging policies.
These results contribute to the literature on corporate incentives for financial
hedging. The received theory shows that financing and hedging are intrinsically
intertwined, which creates conflicting incentives for hedging, as suggested by Stulz
(1996). Positive effects of hedging on corporate financing include (i) reduction in
costly external financing, as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993); (ii) mitigation of
information asymmetry in cash flows, as in DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and DeMarzo
and Duffie (1995); (iii) reduction in expected (convex) taxation and bankruptcy costs,
as in Smith and Stulz (1985); (iv) reduction of borrowing costs, as in Leland (1998);
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(v) reduction in expected distress costs, as in Purnanandam (2008); (vi) reduction
in contracting costs (with creditors, suppliers, and customers), as in Bessembinder
(1991); and (vii) the managerial motivations, as in Breeden and Viswanathan (2016)
and Tufano (1996). This chapter focuses on the first two motives for hedging, although
the other motives could be easily accommodated by extending the theoretical model.
Differently from the other models, we account for two negative economic forces that
may reduce the hedging incentive. First, hedging is suboptimal when cash flow is
positively correlated with lumpy profitable investment opportunities, as in Babenko
and Tserlukevich (2017). Second, in the spirit of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and
Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), a firm (and its executives) may not always intend
to eliminate the informational asymmetry with outside financiers. Indeed, we show
that a high hedge ratio is suboptimal when the firm’s profitability is low, in line with
Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005).
Methodologically, our theory belongs to the growing literature on dynamic
corporate risk management and real investment. Rampini and Viswanathan (2010)
propose a real investment model in which collateral constraints limit both financing
and risk management. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) and Bolton, Chen, and Wang
(2013) build a continuous-time structural model with capital adjustment cost and
derive the optimal hedging and saving policy. Gamba and Triantis (2014) consider
an integrated framework in which operating flexibility, liquidity management, and
financial hedging jointly create values to a firm that faces several market frictions.
Decamps, Gryglewicz, Morellec, and Villeneuve (2017) study optimal risk manage-
ment policies, including asset substitution and financial hedging, of firms whose cash
flows are subject to both permanent and transitory shocks in a continuous-time frame-
work. Albeit in different economic settings, the information and learning assumptions
in this chapter are similar to Holmström (1999), Moyen and Platikanov (2012), Yang
(2013), Acharya and Lambrecht (2015), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016), and He, Wei,
Yu, and Gao (2017). We propose the learning process, however, in quite a different
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fashion from the existing papers. In particular, instead of a steady-state learning, we
construct a framework in which the firm controls the amount of noise in cash flows
through hedging activities in each period. Consequently, the speed of the learning
process of outsiders is eventually controlled by the firm, which is a novel setting that
distinguishes us from the existing models.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces a two–period model,
by illustrating the time line of events, the outsiders’ belief on the firm’s profitability,
and the equilibrium hedging strategies that solves the firm’s value–maximization prob-
lem and satisfies outside investors’ belief. Section 2.3 constructs a general dynamic
model with an infinite time horizon. Section 2.4 shows and discusses the numerical
implementation of the dynamic model. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2. Simple two–period model
To illustrate our main arguments, we introduce a simple model of firm investment
decisions with financing frictions. The key assumption, which will be maintained also
in a more general dynamic model, is that there is informational asymmetry on firm’s
profitability between the controller (insider) and public investors (outsiders). For
simplicity, we make debt a sub–optimal financing tool by assuming that the firm has
a higher cost for accessing to debt.2 Because external equity is more expensive than
internal funding, all financing needs are met by first using up all internal cash reserves
and, only after that, by raising equity capital from the outsiders. Insider can hedge
against some of the firm’s risk to control the extent to which asymmetric information
impacts the cost of external financing. By endogenizing the financing cost and the
outsiders’ inference on firm’s profitability, we determine the equilibrium exercise of
the investment option and the optimal hedging policy.
2Because, for instance, the insider can abscond with all cash flows, which therefore makes assets
cannot be pledged. See Rampini and Viswanathan (2010), for instance.
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Three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, define two periods. At t = 0, insider’s initial net worth
is given as w0 which will be held until t = 1 when an exogenous shock is received.
The exogenous shock yields a cash flow ϕ and has mean equal to zero. Specifically,
we assume that ϕ ∈ [−w0, w0] is uniformly distributed. At t = 0, insider can hedge
against the exogenous risk ϕ by purchasing one–period Arrow–Debreu securities with
unit price zero and a transaction cost c > 0 per unit of nominal values, which must
be paid in advance.3 Specifically, insider can take position in h ∈ [0, 1] shares of the
Arrow–Debreu security, in exchange for the delivery of hϕ at t = 1. Because of the
transaction cost, hedging uses part of the initial cash endowment. This implies that,
given w0, there is a budget constraint ch < w0, and the net worth reserved initially is
w0 − ch > 0.4 Thus, with the hedging decision h and the realization of ϕ, the firm’s
net worth at t = 1 is





, where wl(h) = h(w0 − c) and wu(h) = 2w0 − h(w0 + c).
We denote by f(w1;h) and F (w1;h) as the probability density function (p.d.f.) and
the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of w1(h), respectively. It is noteworthy
that w1 distributes symmetrically about w0−ch. Hence, it can be shown that hedging
directly influences the firm’s cash flow by reducing its mean and variance.
At t = 0, the firm obtains a growth opportunity for investing in a productive
technology with a constant returns to scale, which fully depreciates in one period. The
project can be implemented at t = 1 and requires a fixed investment, k, which may
be financed by raising external capital. However, the project’s profitability, θ > 1, is
privately known by insider since t = 0. In turn, insider makes the investment decision
conditional on the net present value (NPV) of asset being positive and depending of
the net worth available at t = 1 to finance such an investment. We assume that the
3Although we do not need to endogenize this cost to derive our results, one can interpret c as
the cost to negotiate with the dealer or the interest charged on the margin account.
4Bolton and Oehmke (2015) study the seniority for financial derivatives in bankruptcy. However,
as we assume the hedging instrument in our model as default-free, we abstract from bankruptcy.
14
investment’s payoff, received at t = 2, is uniformly distributed with support [0, 2θk],
which is non-hedgeable. That is, absent financing frictions, the NPV of the project
at t = 1 is positive (i.e. −k+ θk) for any k > 0. To make the problem non-trivial, we
assume w0 < k < 2w0, so that, absent (or fully hedging against) the shock ϕ, the firm
would require external financing. Note that, since the payoff is risky, insider cannot
issue risk–free debt to finance the project at t = 1. As illustrated later, by assuming
external financing frictions, we will show that issuing debt to finance k is suboptimal
in our model.
w0 is realized publicly,
k is known publicly,
θ is known privately
0
h ∈ [0, 1] is set,
ch is paid
w1 is realized publicly,





pay dividend if w1 ≥ k
issue equity if w ≤ w1 < k
distribute cash if w1 < w
invest k if w1 ≥ w
If firm invests, w2 is
realized and distributed
2
Figure 2.1: Timeline for the two-period example
Notes: At t = 0, the firm makes hedging decision h, based on the endowment w0, and
the growth opportunity k that can be exercised at t = 1. At t = 1, the firm observes
ϕ and thus obtains w1; the investment decision depends on w1 and k, and w denotes
the threshold for investing; no hedging is made. At t = 2, if the investment k is made
at t = 1, the firm obtains w2, and all cash will be distributed to shareholders.
Figure 2.1 depicts the timeline. At t = 1, as k is fixed, the investment decision
is affected by financing frictions. Specifically, the case w1(h) ≥ k is frictionless, and
insider uses the net worth up to k and payouts w1(h)− k as dividends. Otherwise, if
w1(h) < k, insider raises k−w1(h) from outsiders in exchange of a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of
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the firm’s equity after the investment and incurs an amount of external financing cost.
However, if the financing cost is greater than the profit obtained from investment,
making the NPV negative, insider will forgo the investment.
In what follows, we begin by analyzing the benchmark scenario with symmetric
information, and next we examine the equilibrium for the asymmetric-information
case. Note that, in the latter case, the financing options are affected by informational
asymmetry, and the hedging decision h might have signaling potential at t = 0.
2.2.1. Complete information case
We first analyze the problem under a complete–information condition as a benchmark
model. In this case, insider and outsiders have the same information set and thus the
firm’s equity is correctly priced. At t = 1, if internal reserves are insufficient to make
investment, the financing gap can be bridged by external funds. However, if funds are
raised externally, insider must incur the financing cost which is proportional to the
scale of issuance. Specifically, we denote the dollar cost of external equity financing
as
Λ(h) ≡ Λ(w1, θ, k, h) =
a
θ
·max{k − w1(h), 0}, (2.2)
where a is a positive constant.5 To make the problem non–trivial, we further assume
that the total cost of debt financing is greater than Λ(h) for the same amount of
issuance k − w1(h), which makes debt a sub–optimal financing instrument in our
model, and thus capital structure will not be concerned.6 In turn, external equity
will be the optimal financing tool for insider.
5We assume the external financing cost is negatively related to θ. As suggested by Altinkilic and
Hansen (2000), the underwriting fees of the lower–quality seasoned equity offerings are on average
higher than the higher–quality ones.
6As w2 is not risk–free, one may think that debt could cause a potential financial distress cost as
an addition to the issuance cost, which is beyond the scope of our model. See Purnanandam (2008)
for the discussion on how financial distress cost affects corporate hedging.
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We determine α, the share of equity sold to outsiders, by solving the break–even





Hence, by substituting α(h) as in (2.3), the NPV of insider’s investment at t = 1 is
−w1(h)− Λ(h) + θk(1− α(h)) = −k + θk − Λ(h).
It thus shows that, if insider raises k−w1(h) externally by issuing equity, the NPV of
her investment at t = 1 will be equal to the value of entire project minus the external
financing cost. Investment with external financing is thus equivalent to raising funds
from shareholder and incurring a flotation cost. That gives the firm’s internal reserves
a higher priority than external funds for making investment. Setting insider’s NPV
equal to zero yields a threshold for w1 below which no investment occurs at t = 1.
We denote such a threshold by w, which can be written as
w =
k[a− θ(θ − 1)]
a
. (2.4)
That is, insider would only make investment and incur the financing cost if w1(h) ≥ w.
We assume a ≥ θ(θ−1) to ensure w ≥ 0, making the problem non–trivial. Therefore,
insider’s equity value at t = 1 is the cash flow plus the NPV of the growth project:
V1(θ, w1, k, h) = w1(h) +

−k + θk if k ≤ w1,
−k + θk − Λ(h) if w ≤ w1 < k,
0 if w1 < w,
In the first case, k is fully financed by the firm’s internal reserves. In the second
case, insider invests w1 and raise external capital k −w1 to finance k, as the NPV of
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investment is positive. In the third case, however, the growth opportunity is forgone
and w1(h) is directly distributed to insider. From the above expression, we see that,
by limiting the effect of ϕ, the hedge ratio h influences the investment decision at
t = 1 through w1, resulting in a trade–off between the hedging cost and the increase
in probability of making investment.
Therefore, at t = 0, insider’s problem is to maximize her equity value by
optimally choosing the hedge ratio:




v0(θ, w0, c, k, h)
}
,
where the objective function is written as
v0(θ, w0, c, k, h) ≡ E0[V1(θ, w1, k, h)]








(k − w1(h)) · f(w1;h)dw1. (2.5)
On the right-hand side of equation (2.5), the first term (w0− ch) is the expected cash
flow from the initial investment in the technology, the second term is the expected
profit from the follow-on investment, and the third term denotes the expected dollar
cost of external financing. Note that, as h increases, wl(h) could become higher than
w. In that case, w1(h) is greater than w for any ϕ so that the growth opportunity
will be taken for certain. Hence, the lower limits of integrations of the second and
the third terms are the maximum between w and wl(h). By equating w and wl(h),
we have a threshold for h above which insider can always invest in the growth project
and obtain a positive NPV at t = 1:





Similarly, as h increases, wu(h) could become lower than k, implying a threshold for
h above which w1(h) is always smaller than k:




In other words, with h > hu, insider must raise external funds, in addition to her
reserves, to invest in the growth project, if the investment is made, because wu(h) < k.
Defining hl(w0, c, w) and h
u(w0, c, k) helps identifying the optimal hedge ratio. The
following lemma that describes the optimal hedge ratio of insider in the complete–
information case. The proof of the lemma is in Appendix 2.6.1.
Lemma 2.1. Absent asymmetric information, then, for h > 0, depending on the
parameters setting, the local maximum of v0(θ, w0, c, k, h) occurs when h = h
0 where
h0 ≡ h0(θ, w0, c, k) = 1−
√
a(k − w0 + c)
a(w0 − c)2 − 4θw0c
. (2.8)
Insider’s optimal hedge ratio at t = 0 is h0 if c ≤ c̄, or zero if c > c̄, where
c̄ =
θw0M












Figure 2.2 plots two examples of v0 against the hedge ratio h in the complete–
information case, with different levels of c. The upper panel depicts a case where the
equity value is maximized by choosing h0 = hu. It is noteworthy that, in our model,
it is never optimal to fully hedge (h = 1), as this would jeopardize the chance of
getting a high cash flow from ϕ. In the lower panel, as the equity value is maximized
when the hedge ratio is zero, insider would not hedge.
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Figure 2.2: Value effect of the hedge ratio (Static)
Notes: The upper panel of the figure depicts the value of insider’s equity, v0, against
the hedge ratio, h, given c = 0.01. The lower panel of the figure depicts v0 against h,
given c = 0.08. The hedge ratio h takes values from zero to one. The parameterization
is: (i)θ = 1.2, (ii) w0 = 2, (iii) c = 0.01, (iv) k = 2.5, and (v) a = 0.4.
Note that we denote c̄ as a threshold for c above which insider will choose
to not hedge. Figure 2.3 plots c̄ against θ in the complete-information case. From
the numerical result, it is noteworthy that c̄ is weakly monotonically increasing in θ.
Notably, in Figure 2.3, c̄ crosses the horizontal axis, implying that not all firms would
hedge even if c = 0. Taking the baseline case in the upper panel as an example, if a
firm has profitability lower than 1.0, then no hedging position would be taken for any
c ≥ 0. Henceforth, in this chapter, to avoid the trivial case in which no hedging is
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optimal, we will consider only the case where transaction cost is relatively small (i.e.,
c ≤ c̄). This is consistent with Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) and Gamba and Triantis
(2014). In practice, the costs of trading the hedging instruments would be even lower
if highly liquid and standardized financial derivatives are used.
Figure 2.3: Hedging conditions (Static)
Notes: The figure depicts the condition for hedging, c̄, against θ in the complete-
information case. The firm with profitability θ would set a non-zero hedge ratio only
if the transaction cost c ≤ c̄. Otherwise, insider would not hedge. Lines with different
markers assume various investment costs, k. The dash-dotted line stands for c̄ = 0.
The parameterization is: (i) w0 = 2, (ii) θ = 1.2, (iii) k = 2.5, and (iv) a = 0.4.
Figure 2.4 depicts insider’s optimal hedge ratio under the complete–information
condition, h0, as obtained in Lemma 2.1, against θ. Note that parameterization for c
is set as smaller than c̄, and thus we can focus on the case in which the optimal hedge
ratio is non-zero. We also let c take various values between (0, 0.02] and find that the
results are nearly identical in regards to slopes and levels, which are not reported here
for brevity. It is shown that h0 is monotonically decreasing in θ. This is inconsistent
with the theory of Rampini and Viswanathan (2010), whereby wealthier firms would
hedge more. In our model, comparing with low-profitability ones, a firm with larger θ
has smaller w given the same level of hedging, thus that it is more likely to invest in
the positive–NPV growth project at t = 1. One may note that h0 is not a continuous
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function of θ. This is because in our model, as k is exogenously given rather than
optimized by insider, the investment at t = 1 is a discrete decision, and thus from
Lemma 2.1, insider might have no hedging incentive for some θ, despite the value
function v0 has local maximum for h > 0.
Figure 2.4: Optimal hedging (complete information, Static)
Notes: The figure depicts insider’ optimal hedge ratio with complete information, h0,
against θ. The baseline parameterization is: (i)θ = 1.2, (ii) w0 = 2, (iii) c = 0.01,
(iv) k = 2.5, and (v) a = 0.4.
2.2.2. Asymmetric information case
Now we consider the incomplete–information scenario in which the profitability and
exogenous shocks can only be privately observed by insider and are therefore concealed
to outsiders. In other words, when a firm’s insider raises external capital k − w1(h)
in the financial market at t = 1, public investors cannot know the profitability of
project. Suppose two firms, with identical technology, exist in the market, at t = 0,
each firm is endowed with w0, and obtains a follow-on growth opportunity k. The
good firm has profitability θg, and the bad firm has profitability θb, where θg > θb.
7
7In reality, there could be a continuum of possible values for a firm’s quality but the augment
would not change.
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We assume that, without any signals from the actions of insiders, the public prior
belief that a firm has profitability θg is b(θg) = 1/2, and thus b(θb) = 1/2.
We assume that the firms’ insiders disclose their hedge ratios.8 Once the firms’
hedging policies are observed at t = 0, outsiders would believe that the good firm
chooses a lower hedge ratio.9 We denote the optimal hedge ratios with complete
information of the two firms as h0g ≡ h0g(θg, w0, c, k) and h0b ≡ h0b(θb, w0, c, k), respec-
tively. We investigate possible types of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) where
the firms could be differentiated by the hedge ratios they choose.
Before starting the analysis, we rule out the uninteresting cases where either or
both of the two firms would not hedge, that is, the cases where c > c̄(θg) or c > c̄(θb).
Instead, we would focus on the cases where both firms would set a positive hedge
ratio. Specifically, we restrict our analysis in the cases where c ≤ c̄(θb) < c̄(θg).10
In principle, there are two possible pure–strategy separating PBEs at t = 0.
Denote by h∗g and h
∗
b the optimal hedge ratios of the good firm and the bad firm,
respectively, in the incomplete–information case. If, in equilibrium, a firm differenti-
ates from the other by choosing a hedge ratio that matches outsiders’ belief, then the
outsiders correctly distinguish them at t = 0 and do not need to update their prior
belief on the firms’ profitability at t = 1. In the first type of equilibrium, both firms
set positive hedge ratios, and the good firm sets a higher hedge ratio than the bad
firm, i.e. h∗g > h
∗
b . In the second type of equilibrium, the good firm chooses a lower
hedge ratio than the bad firm, i.e. h∗g < h
∗
b .
First of all, by intuition, we can rule out the first type of equilibrium in which
the good firm sets a higher hedge ratio than the bad firm. As aforementioned, we
only consider the cases in which c ≤ c̄(θb), and thus we always have 0 < h0g < h0b if the
8This is empirically supported. See, for example, the survey paper by Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and
Walther (2010) for a review of the literature on financial reporting.
9Recall that, as shown by equation (2.8) and Figure 2.4, the firm’s hedge ratio is decreasing in θ.
10As shown in Figure 2.3, c̄ is weakly increasing in θ.
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firms were in the complete–information scenario. If, with asymmetric information,
the good firm sets a hedge ratio h′ ≥ h0b , its equity will be under–priced at t = 1. In
addition, as h′ is greater than h0g, the transaction cost of hedging ch
′ > ch0g. The good
firm’s insider, thus, would find it better to choose a hedge ratio lower than h′. As a
result, the story would end up with either another type of separating equilibrium or
the pooling equilibrium. Therefore, the first type of equilibrium never sustains.
In the second type of separating equilibrium, the bad firm lowers its hedge
ratio to h0g to mimic because doing so makes its equity over–priced. While this is
profitable for the bad firm, the good firm’s equity will be under–priced. In response,
the good firm could decrease its hedge ratio to h∗g < h
0
g, below which the bad firm is
unable to mimic, thus that outsiders can separate the two firms and correctly price the














vi,0 represents the objective function of the firm i, for i ∈ {g, b}. Specifically, we have
the incentive compatibility condition for the good firm as:





(k − w1(h∗g)) · f(w1;h∗g)dw1





(k − w1(h0g)) · f(w1;h0g)dw1, (2.10)
and the condition for the bad firm:





(k − w1(h∗g)) · f(w1;h∗g)dw1





(k − w1(h0b)) · f(w1;h0b)dw1, (2.11)
where θ̂ = θgb(θg) + θbb(θb) = (θg + θb)/2. Note that, if the two firms’ insiders set
the same hedge ratio, outsiders cannot distinguish the true qualities and thus set a
belief θ̂ for both firms. In words, condition (2.10) ensures that the good firm’s insider
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prefers being separated to being pooled, and condition (2.11) ensures that the bad
firm’s insider does not mimic the counterpart, as setting h∗b = h
∗
g would cost more than
the potential profit from equity over–valuation. Otherwise, if either condition (2.10)
or (2.11) is violated, a separating PBE cannot sustain.
Lemma 2.2. Given 0 < h0g < h
0




b can never sustain.
The proof of Lemma 2.2 is in Appendix 2.6.1. We thus show that neither of
the two types of separating PBE can sustain, given h0b > h
0
g > 0. As a result, in our
model, hedge ratio cannot be a reliable signal of a firm’s quality at t = 0.
Now we investigate an intuitive pooling equilibrium in which the insiders of the
two firms set identical hedge ratio at t = 0. In that case, outsiders would believe that
hedge ratio contains no information on the firm’s quality. In turn, they would expect
the two firms have the same quality, θ̂, which is the average of θg and θb. Similarly
to Lemma 2.1, we can show that, in the incomplete–information case, the optimal
hedge ratio of the good firm’s insider is
h∗g = 1−
√
a(k − w0 + c)
a(w0 − c)2 − 4θ̂w0c
. (2.12)
Note that, with h∗g, as the NPV of investment is positive at t = 1, the good firm’s
insider still has incentive to invest in the growth project, although the firm’s equity
security would be under–priced. However, for the pooling equilibrium to be sustained,




b) thus that the bad firm’s insider would always
mimic the counterpart by setting h∗b = h
∗
g. The condition for the pooling equilibrium
sustainable can be written as





(k − w1(h∗g)) · f(w1;h0g)dw1





(k − w1(h0b)) · f(w1;h0b)dw1. (2.13)
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Lemma 2.3. Given 0 < h0g < h
0
b , a pooling PBE where both firms set the same hedge
ratio h∗g sustains.
The proof of Lemma 2.3 is in Appendix 2.6.1. Therefore, we show that only
pooling equilibrium sustains, and thus, hedge ratio at t = 0 contains no information
on the firm’s profitability in this two–period model. Outsiders could not infer the
firm’s true quality based on its hedge ratio at t = 0. Based on this intuition, we
construct a dynamic model with an infinite time horizon and introduce the learning
process for outsiders in Section 2.3. Note that the intuition that hedging is not a
signal of the firm’s true quality is important for the assumption of outsiders’ learning
because otherwise, once the firms’ qualities can be separated, outsiders do not need
to update their belief later on.
2.2.3. External financing cost
Now we discuss the effect of hedging on the external financing cost and compare it
in the complete– and incomplete–information cases. With complete–information, as
the dollar cost of external financing, Λ(h), at t = 1 is given as in equation (2.2), the






(k − w1(h)) · f(w1;h)dw1.











(k − w1(h)) · f(w1;h)dw1.
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Figure 2.5: Probability of external financing (Static)
Notes: The figure depicts the probability of using external financing of the firm
with θg against h. The dashed line assumes the complete–information case, the solid
line assumes the incomplete–information case. The baseline parameterization is: (i)
θg = 1.2, (ii) θ̂ = 1.18, (ii) w0 = 2, (iii) c = 0.01, (iv) k = 2.5, and (v) a = 0.4.
Figure 2.5 provides examples of the contribution of hedging on the likelihood
that the good firm’s insider raises external funds to invest in the growth project. It
shows that hedging increases the likelihood of external financing regardless of whether
there is information asymmetry or not, which is opposite to the prediction by Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) that hedging reduces the likelihood of costly external
financing. In fact, this is a result of our model feature. Note that the probability




lowers the variance of w1 and so it makes the left tail of the distribution thinner.
The intuition behind this result is that raising external funds of k − w1(h) to invest
always delivers a positive NPV for the firm’s insider. In turn, when increasing the
hedge ratio, the likelihood of investing the growth project increases, while the chance
of obtaining w1 ≥ k becomes lower, implying that the likelihood of tapping external
capital is higher. As h increases, when wl(h) ≥ w and wu(h) < k, insider would raise
external capital to finance the project for sure, and thus, the probability of external
financing becomes one.
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Figure 2.6: External financing cost (Static)
Notes: The figure depicts the expected dollar cost of external financing of the firm
with θg, E0[Λ], against h. The dashed line assumes the complete–information case,
the solid line assumes the incomplete–information case where outsiders set belief θ̂.
The baseline parameterization is: (i)θg = 1.2, (ii) θ̂ = 1.18, (ii) w0 = 2, (iii) c = 0.01,
(iv) k = 2.5, and (v) a = 0.4.
Figure 2.6 provides examples of the contribution of hedging on the expected
external financing cost for the firm with θg. The function with incomplete–information
(the solid line) is based on the best–response of the counterpart. For example, if the
good firm chooses hg = 0.6, the solid line is such that the bad firm mimics, i.e.
hb = 0.6, and outsiders set belief θ̂, which is consistent with our equilibrium analysis.
Note that the external financing cost at t = 1 is determined by two components: the
likelihood of tapping external capital and the total amount of external funds, both
controlled by h. As h increases from zero, firstly, the likelihood of external financing
monotonically increases and dominates the second component. And as h grows larger,
the contribution of h on k − w1(h) becomes dominating. As a result, one may see
a non–monotonic relation between E0[Λ(h)] and h. More importantly, this lends an
interior optimal hedge ratio, which is a key feature that differs our model from prior
theories.
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2.3. The dynamic model
We now model investment, financing, and hedging decisions in an infinite–horizon
discrete–time dynamic and stochastic framework. We generalize the cash flow wt(ht),
for t = 1, 2, ...,∞, with the following specifications. First, we assume that the capital
stock is fully depreciated over a period and that, to recreate the production capacity,
the firm receives an investment opportunity kt in each period. As in the two–period
model, at time t, the firm’s insider would decide whether to make the investment
and the level of hedge ratio. We assume that the amount of exogenous risk received
by the firm is proportional to the scale of the investment at t. Therefore, given the
investment decision, the net worth at t is
wt ≡ w(θt, kt, ϕt, ht) = θtkt + (1− ht)ϕtkt, (2.14)
where kt is financed by the internal reserves if kt ≤ wt−1 − cht; otherwise, insider
could raise external funds to bridge the financing gap if kt + cht > wt−1. Note that,
in our model, kt can be a measure of firm size.
We assume that the latent profitability shock, θt, follows an AR(1) process,
given as
θt = (1− ρ)θ̄ + ρθt−1 + εt, εt ∼ iid N (0, σ2ε), (2.15)
where θ̄ is the firm’s long–run mean, 0 ≤ ρ < 1 is the persistence parameter, N
denotes the normal distribution, and σε is the conditional standard deviation of the
error term εt. We assume that the long–run average of profitability shocks, θ̄, is
publicly known. The firm’s insider observes θt at t and always keeps an informational
advantage on θt, because outsiders can only update their perception of θt after they
observe wt at the end of each period. We assume that outsiders’ prior belief about θt
at t = 0 has distribution N (µ0, η20).
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The latent exogenous risk, ϕt, are independent and identically distributed vari-
ates with distribution N (0, σ2), where σ is a constant. We assume that {θt} and {ϕt}
are mutually independent processes, that is, E [εtϕt] = 0. Hence, by observing a large
wt at t, outsiders cannot disentangle whether it is because of a high profitability θt
or a favorable realization of ϕt.
In our dynamic model, we assume and formulate that in each period, outsiders
can update their belief on θt by observing wt and kt. Specifically, the outsiders’ noisy
information on θt received at t is
wt
kt
= θt + (1− ht)ϕt, (2.16)
where ht controls the noise term (1 − ht)ϕt. That is, ht reduces the volatility of wt
and makes wt more informative about θt. Hence, by observing the sequence {wt},
outsiders can learn and update their belief on θt. In our model, the learning process
is proposed as the well–known Kalman filter problem.11 The following lemma defines
and describes the learning process. The proof is in Appendix 2.6.1.
Lemma 2.4. Given the initialization µ0 ≡ E0[θ1] and η20 ≡ E0[(θ1 − µ0)2] at t = 0,
the posterior distribution of {θt}, for t > 0 is normal with mean
µt ≡ µ(ht) = btwtk−1t + (1− bt)(ρµt−1 + (1− ρ)θ̄), (2.17)
and variance
η2t ≡ η(ht)2 = (1− ht)2σ2bt, (2.18)
where bt corresponds to the Kalman gain, given by the following expression:






ε + (1− ht)2σ2
. (2.19)
11The Kalman filter process was seminally developed in Kalman (1960) and Kalman and Bucy
(1961). See textbooks such as Simon (2006).
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For t > 0, the estimation error of outsiders’ posterior belief has zero mean, Et [θt+1 − µt]
= 0, and variance η2t ≡ Et[(θt+1− µt)2]. The speed of adjustment of the learning pro-
cess is measured as 1− ρ(1− bt).
The learning formula (2.17) implies that to obtain the belief µt at t, outsiders
would put weight bt on the latest observation of wtk
−1
t , and put weight (1− bt) on the
past belief µt−1 and the long–run mean of profitability shock, θ̄. In equation (2.18), ht
reduces the variance of the estimation error. In addition, since bt increases with ht, for
any t ≥ 0, the outsiders’ learning speed, 1− ρ(1− bt), increases with ht. Altogether,
the learning process at t is more efficient as ht increases. Figure 2.7 shows the effect
of ht on the Kalman gain and the learning speed, respectively. As can be seen, as h
increases, outsiders’ information gain increases because wt becomes more informative.
As a result, outsiders’ learning speed also accelerates with h.
Now we formulate the external financing cost function in relation to outsiders’
belief on the firm’s profitability, based on the derivations from Section 2.2.3. However,
in the dynamic model, we are not endogenizing the financing cost, but instead, we use
the reduced–form of the flotation cost as in (2.20), based on what we learned from the
two-period model. We assume that a flotation cost is incurred when the firm raises
funds from outsiders by issuing equity. Equity issuance is equivalent to distribute a
negative cash flow to the owner of the firm. Therefore, denoted by λt ≡ λ(µt) the
flotation cost for per–unit of equity issuance, we formulate a reduced–form of the
external financing cost by assuming that λ′(µt) < 0.
12 Specifically, we formulate λt
as follows:




where a is a constant parameter.
12Note that, in the two–period example, when the firm needs to issue equity to raise funds, the
fraction of equity sold is as expression (2.3). It is then equivalent to distribute w1 − k2 − θk2α̂ =
(w1 − k2)(1 + θ/θ̂) amount of cash to the firm’s owner at t = 1. Thus, the term θ/θ̂ denotes the
flotation cost incurred by equity issuance.
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Figure 2.7: Kalman gain and learning speed (Dynamic)
Notes: The figure depicts the Kalman gain against ht in the top panel, and the
learning speed against ht in the bottom panel, respectively. In each panel, lines with
different markers correspond to various parameter settings. The baseline parameter-
ization is σε = 0.15, σ = 3.0, and η0 = 3.0.
From this specification, if outsiders under–estimate the firm’s profitability (i.e.,
µt < θt), then λ(µt) is larger than the fair flotation cost λ(θt), which is unfavorable
to the owner of the firm. Hence, as in the two–period example, hedging increases
the accuracy of outsiders’ estimation on the firm’s profitability and thus reduces the
flotation cost. However, unlike the two–period example, as θt changes over time, a
firm with high quality could be overpriced if µt > θt for any t. In that case, hedging
would mitigate the chance for the firm of getting profit from over–valuation, which
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actually demotivates the firm to hedge. To summarize, the dollar cost of external
financing incurred by the firm at time t, based on the decision (kt+1, ht+1), is
Λt ≡ Λ(µt) = λt ·max {kt+1 + cht+1 − wt, 0} . (2.21)
To give an intuition of the marginal effect of hedging on the expected external financ-
ing cost, we plot Et [µt+1] and Et [Λt+1] against ht+1 in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: External financing cost (Dynamic)
Notes: The figure depicts the expected belief od outsiders Et [µt+1], the absolute of
expected external financing cost factor Et [λt+1], against ht+1 in the top panel and the
bottom panel, respectively. In each panel, lines with different markers correspond to
various parameter settings of σ. The baseline parameterization is θ̄ = 1.9, ρ = 0.8,
σε = 0.15, ηt = 0.3, kt = kt+1 = 2.2, c = 0.01, a = 0.2, µt = 1.75, and wt = 2.
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Finally, in our model, we assume that the firm’s insider does not hold cash
when the realized cash flow exceeds the investment, and that she cannot switch the
firm’s operating status from idle to active; that is, once she decides to terminate the
firm’s operation, she distributes all the cash reserves at time t, and the firm becomes
insolvent.13 Therefore, at t, the firm’s insider maximizes her equity value by choosing
the optimal hedging ht+1 and investment kt+1 as




{dt + βEt [V (wt+1, θt+1, µt+1)]}
}
, (2.22)
where kt+1 ∈ {0, k}, k > 0 is an exogenously given constant, specifically,
kt+1 =

k, if βEt[Vt+1] ≥ kt+1 + cht+1 + Λt,
0, if βEt[Vt+1] > kt+1 + cht+1 + Λt,
ht+1 ∈ [0, 1], and
dt ≡ d(wt, θt, µt, kt+1, ht+1) =

wt − kt+1 − cht+1 − Λt, if kt+1 = k,
wt, if kt+1 = 0,
denotes the dividend distributed at t, β is the constant discount factor, and Et[V (wt+1,
θt+1, µt+1)] is the continuation value that results from the policy (ht+1, kt+1). For
brevity, we use Et[Vt+1] to denote the continuation value. At time t, the firm’s insider
finds it profitable to continue the production and chooses kt+1 because the NPV of the
continuation value exceeds the total cost paid for producing, hedging, and external
financing, i.e. βEt[Vt+1] ≥ kt+1 + cht+1 + Λt. Note that, if external equity is raised,
it is equivalent to distribute a negative dividend which is augmented by the flotation
cost, λt. However, if the owner finds βEt[Vt+1] < kt+1 + cht+1 + Λt, it will be optimal
13See Gamba and Triantis (2014) for comparisons among various risk management tools.
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for her to distribute all cash, as investments are no longer profitable.
Figure 2.9 shows the timeline of events of the dynamic model. Note that, in
the absence of the signalling concern, we assume that outsiders update their belief
µt and adjust the flotation price λt once wt is realized. The owner of the firm would
then decide whether to continue the investment, based on the price λt. Hence, the
outsiders’ belief µt can be regarded as a natural state for the firm, and there will be
no interaction between the owner of the firm and outsiders during the period.
θt and ϕt revealed to










θt+1 and ϕt+1 revealed
to the firm insider and
wt+1 realized publicly
t+ 1
Figure 2.9: Timeline for the dynamic model
Notes: At time t, wt is realized, and the owner of the firm observes θt as an informa-
tional advantage. Outsiders use the information from wt to update their belief µt on
θt+1 and adjust the price of issuance. The owner of the firm then decides whether to
continue the business by setting kt+1 = k or to liquidate the firm by choosing kt+1 = 0
and distribute all cash to shareholders, conditional on the cash balance. If kt+1 = k
is chosen, the owner of the firm maximizes the equity value by optimizing ht+1. If
the equity value is negative, the owner defaults.
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2.4. Numerical analysis of the dynamic model
The solution of the dynamic model is based on a numerical approximation of the in-
finite horizon dynamic programming problem in (2.22) by a discrete state space and
successive approximation method, following Terry and Knotek II (2011). The dynam-
ics of the logarithmic AR(1) in equation (2.15) is approximated by the quadrature
method of Tauchen (1986), where the discrete grids of the Markov chain and the
risk-neutral transition probabilities are found by a Gauss-–Hermite quadrature rule.
Details of the numerical procedure are provided in Appendix 2.6.2. Table 2.1 reports
the baseline parameters which are determined based on the prevailing literature.14
θ̄ Long-term mean of productivity shock 1.6
ρ Persistence of productivity shock 0.8
σε Annual volatility of productivity shock 0.3
σ Annual volatility of exogenous shock 3.0
ηt Standard deviation of outsiders’ belief at t 0.3
wt Cash flow obtained at t 1.0
k Investment scale (constant) 1.8
c negotiation cost of financial derivatives 1%
r Annual risk-free interest rate 5%
a Flotation cost factor for equity issuance 0.2
Table 2.1: Baseline Parameter Values of the Dynamic Model
2.4.1. Model solution with complete information
We begin by examining the effect of the firm characteristics on the optimal hedging
decision in the complete–information case where no asymmetric information exists
between the insider of the firm and the outsiders, thus that the flotation cost function
λt in equation (2.20) becomes aθ
−2
t , where θt has already been observed.
14See Yang (2013) and Gamba and Triantis (2014) for details.
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Figure 2.10 depicts the optimal hedge ratio with complete information, h0t+1,
against the profitability shock θt. To better isolate the effects of other factors, we
plot the policy function for various level of θ̄ and k. We summarize the following two
noteworthy findings.
Figure 2.10: Optimal hedging (Dynamic with complete information)
Notes: The three panels depict the optimal hedge ratio against θt with complete
information. The top panel assumes θ̄ = 1.3, the middle panel assumes θ̄ = 1.6, and
the bottom panel assumes θ̄ = 1.9, respectively. In this case, the flotation cost, λt,
becomes aθ−2t . In each panel, lines with different markers correspond to various k.
The baseline parameterization corresponds to the values in Table 2.1.
First, as expected, the relation between h0t+1 and θt is weakly increasing. Fur-
thermore, looking among the three panels, we find that, ceteris paribus, the firm with
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higher θ̄ would hedge more than the firm with lower θ̄. These are consistent with the
results obtained in the two–period model in Figure 2.4. The intuition behind such re-
sults revolves around that, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, wealthier firms would hedge
more, as hedging is relatively cheaper for them and thus h0t+1 would increase with θt
and θ̄. Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) empirically test such prediction and
find a positive relation between hedging and the firm’s net worth.
Second, in line with the two–period model, overall h0t+1 has a negative relation
with k. As k increases, h0t decreases for three reasons. First, as the potential external
financing needs become larger, the owner of the firm would prefer to leave part of
the cash flow unhedged in order to bet on the high realizations of ϕ, as discussed
in Section 2.2.1. Second, in the dynamic model, a larger k per se implies a higher
continuation value for the firm and thus a higher likelihood of making investment in
the next period. As a result, the incentive for reducing the left tail of the distribution
of ϕ would be weaker. Third, as k can be referred to as a measure of firm size, a small
firm would be more likely to reduce the variation of ϕt since it is more vulnerable to
exogenous risks. This is counterfactual, though.
2.4.2. Model solution with asymmetric information
We now analyze the firm’s optimal hedge ratio, denoted by h∗t+1, in the case where
asymmetric information exists between the owner of the firm and outsiders. We
numerically solve h∗t+1 by using similar methods in Yang (2013) and Gamba and Tri-
antis (2014). Figure 2.11 depicts h∗t+1 as a function of θt, and Figure 2.12 depicts h
∗
t+1
against µt, respectively. Three important features of h
∗
t+1 that may have testable
empirical implications stand out in these two figures.
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Figure 2.11: Optimal hedging against profitability shocks (Dynamic with
asymmetric information)
Notes: The figure depicts the optimal hedge ratio against θt under the incomplete-
information condition. The dashed line corresponds to the case where µt < θ̄, the solid
line corresponds to µt = θ̄, the line marked with + corresponds to µt > θ̄, the dash-
dot line represents h0t+1 as the optimal hedge ratio in the complete-information case,
respectively. The baseline parameterization corresponds to the values in Table 2.1.
We also plot the policy function with various parameter settings and obtain very
similar patterns with slightly different levels.
First, not surprisingly, with asymmetric information and learning, the belief of
outsiders becomes an important determinant of hedging policies. It therefore proves
that information asymmetry issue would alter the firm’s incentive for hedging. In
Figure 2.11, the line with a lower µt always lies above the line with a higher µt,
implying that the firm would hedge more aggressively when outsiders’ belief is lower
than the long–run profitability of the firm. Further, Figure 2.12 shows that h∗t+1 has
a monotonic negative relation with µt. Intuitively, if µt is lower than θ̄, outsiders
would be more likely to under–estimate the firm’s quality in next period, and thus,
the owner of the firm would have more incentive to reveal the true profitability by
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eliminating the variation of ϕ. This incentive becomes stronger as θt increases thus
that h∗t+1 has a upward slope. Hence, the first testable prediction would be that firms
with an under–estimated profitability would have more incentive for hedging, espe-
cially when they obtain favorable profitability shocks, or in the boom market states,
and vice versa.
Figure 2.12: Optimal hedging against the belief of outsiders (Dynamic with
asymmetric information)
Notes: The figure depict the optimal hedge ratio against µt under the incomplete-
information condition. The dashed line corresponds to the case where θt < θ̄, the
solid line corresponds to θt = θ̄, and the line marked with + corresponds to θt > θ̄,
respectively. The baseline parameterization corresponds to the values in Table 2.1.
We also plot the policy function with various parameter settings and obtain very
similar patterns with slightly different levels.
Second, from Figure 2.11, the policy function h∗t+1 against θt is steeper than
the corresponding h0t+1 in Figure 2.10. In particular, for the case in which µt < θ̄,
h∗t+1 increases more rapidly, which implies that, with asymmetric information, the
firm’s hedging choice is more sensitive than in the complete–information case. One
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possible interpretation is inspired by what DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) assert, that
by eliminating a source of noise, hedging makes cash flows more informative about
the firm’s profitability and the public perception of a firm’s value more sensitive to
its realized cash flows. In turns, if the firm observes θt < θ̄, the owner would prefer
h∗t+1 < h
0
t+1 to decelerate outsiders’ learning. However, if θt > θ̄, the owner would
prefer to set h∗t+1 > h
0
t+1 to accelerate outsiders’ learning. Figure 2.12 also shows
similar pattern as the line with a smaller θt always lies below the one with a larger
θt. Therefore, in practice, one could expect that, in the presence of asymmetric
information, corporate hedging policies are more sensitive to the profitability shocks
and market states than the one predicted by complete information models such as
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011).
Third, from Figure 2.12, we find that, with a higher realizations of θt, h
∗
t+1
becomes flatter. As aforementioned, the incentive for hedging decrease with µt as the
firm would wish to enjoy the benefit from equity overvaluation by setting a low hedge
ratio. This implication is particularly effective when the realized profitability shock
is below the average. In contrast, if the firm realizes θt > θ̄, the owner would be
less motivated to blur the learning of outsiders. Therefore, ceteris paribus, one may
expect in practice that hedging is more sensitive to the belief of outsiders when the
firm realizes an unfavorable profitability shock, or when the market is in recession.
This result also provides a possible explanation on the mixed empirical evidence on
corporate hedging policies.
2.5. Conclusions
In this chapter, we theoretically analyze the corporate incentive for financial hedg-
ing in the presence of external financing frictions and asymmetric information on
the profitabilities of firms. We reconcile some seemingly contrasting conventional
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notions regarding the hedging incentives. Optimal hedging trades off the benefits of
less–frequent and less–costly external financing with a better ability to finance invest-
ment. When making hedging decisions, firms should consider the perspective on their
profitabilities, the severity of information asymmetry, the perspective of the growth
opportunity, and all inevitable (opportunity) costs caused by hedging.
Our simple two–period model shows that, without learning process of outsiders,
hedging activity cannot be a reliable signal of the firm’s quality, and thus, firms could
not influence market belief or alter the price of external financing by optimizing their
hedge ratios. This is seemingly inconsistent with the conclusion made by incomplete–
information models, such as Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), because in our simple
model, cash flow is not informative about the firm’s true quality with or without
hedging activities.
Our dynamic model, which builds on the two–period example, further makes
some testable predictions that may have empirical implications. First, firms with an
under-estimated profitability would have more incentive for hedging, especially when
they obtain favorable profitability shocks, and vice versa. Second, corporate hedging
policies are more sensitive to the profitability shocks and market states than the one
predicted by the complete information models. Third, hedging is more sensitive to
the belief of outsiders when the firm realizes an unfavorable profitability shock, or
when the market is in recession. The results of our dynamic model emphasize the
importance of information asymmetry to corporate incentives for financial hedging




2.6.1. Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Defining v0 in equation (2.5) the objective function, firstly, for
w ≥ wl(h), i.e. for h ≤ hl, where hl is given as in equation (2.6), we have









Thus, differentiating and re-arranging give the first–order derivative of v0 with respect













2ak(θ − 1)(w0 − c− w)− θk2(θ − 1)2
2aw0(1− h)3
.
As shown, when v′0(h) = 0, v
′′
0(h) must be greater than zero, as c > 0, implying that
no local maximum point exists for any (w0, c, θ, k) when h ∈ [0, hl].
Secondly, for wl(h) ≤ w and wu(h) ≥ k, i.e. for hl ≤ h ≤ hu, we have






as in this case, the growth project will be invested for sure. Thus, differentiating and





= −c+ a[(w0 − c)(2− h)− k][k − h(w0 − c)]
4w0θ(1− h)2
.
Setting v′0(h) = 0 yields the first–order condition (f.o.c.), and solving the f.o.c. gives















a(w0 − c)2 − 4aw0cθ
a(w0 + c)2
< 1,
which gives h0 < hu, and thus hl < h0 < hu.
Thirdly, for wu(h) ≤ k, i.e. for h ≥ hu, w1(h) is always greater than w but
smaller than k thus that the growth project will be mutually invested by insider and
outsiders at t = 1 for any realizations of ϕ. In turn, we have
v0(h;w0, c, θ, k) = θ(w0 − ch) + k(θ − 1)−
a
θ
(k − w0 + ch),




= −c(1 + a
θ
),
which is a negative constant, implying that v0 is a straight line with negative slope
for h ≥ hu. Therefore, the unique peak point of v0 exists when h = h0.
Finally, we are showing the threshold for c above which v0(h
0, w0, c, θ, k) <
v0(0, w0, θ, k). That is, v0 is maximized by h = h
0 only if c is below the threshold, c̄,
which can be written as in equation (2.9).
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· (k − w
l(h0b))
2
θb(1− h0b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
,





θb < θ̂ < θg. In addition, to ensure the second type of separating PBE sustainable, we
have h∗g < h
0
g. These together yield A1 < A3, A2 < A4, and A3 < A2. However, the
condition A3 > A4 must be violated. Hence, the separating PBE cannot sustain.















As we have (strictly) θg > θb and thus h
∗
g in equation (2.12) must be lower than h
0
b .
Thus, condition (2.13) holds for any θb < θg, and thus, the bad firm’s insider would
always mimic the counterpart. Hence, the pooling equilibrium exists and sustains.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. The Kalman filter is initialized (unconditionally) as follows
µ0 = E0 [θ1] ,
and η20 = E0[(θ1 − µ0)2].
The Kalman learning process is then given by the following equations, which are
computed iteratively for each period t > 0. Assume that at t = 0, before observe
wtk
−1




θt+1|w1k−11 , w2k−12 , ..., wt−1k−1t−1
]
= ρµt−1 + (1− ρ)θ̃,
and
P−t = Et[(θt+1 − µ−t )2]
= ρ2η2t−1 + σ
2
ε .
Thus, at this fictitious stage, outsiders have the Kalman gain as:
bt =
P−t







ε + (1− ht)2σ2
.
Finally, after observe wtk
−1
t , outsiders update their posteriori estimates as
µt = Et
[
θt+1|w1k−11 , w2k−12 , ..., wt−1k−1t−1, wtk−1t
]
= µ−t + bt(w1k
−1
1 − µ−t )
= (1− bt)(ρµt−1 + (1− ρ)θ̃) + btw1k−11 ,
and
η2t = Et[(θt+1 − µt)2]
= (1− bt)P−t
= (1− ht)2σ2bt.
By definition, this learning process has the speed of adjustment as 1− ρ(1− bt).
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2.6.2. Numerical Methods
The numerical solution of the dynamic model is obtained through a dynamic program-
ming iteration. We use discretization to approximate the continuous state variables,
following Terry and Knotek II (2011) and Tauchen (1986). In particular, we let θt, wt,
and µt take values from intervals whose centers are the corresponding long-run means
of the variables. In each range, 9 points are equally distributed. The value functions
are represented as functions on the grid points, and a piecewise linear interpolation
is used when function values on the non–grid points are needed.
The expectation is computed using the Gauss–Hermite quadrature method
with n = 11 sample points. In the quadrature method, the Gaussian integral is
















In the numerical solution of the dynamic model, the optimal hedge ratios are
computed through the backward deduction using the recursive formulas in Section 2.3.
Note that, with complete information, there will be no discretization for µt, as µt is
a known state in this case. Stationary solutions are found by iterating the recursive
procedure until the errors of the value functions between adjacent iterations are less
than 10−5. The procedures normally converge within 400 iterations.
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Chapter 3
Theory and Evidence on Corporate
Financial Risk Management with
Growth Opportunities
3.1. Introduction
What determines the extent to which non–financial firms engage in financial risk
management? This chapter aims to reconciling some seemingly contrasting notions
regarding the hedging incentives. I re–examine the conventional theories of corporate
hedging in the presence of external financing needs due to investments and market
frictions such as informational asymmetry on firm’s profitability. I argue that existing
theory models and empirical evidence are mixed in two aspects. First, the prevailing
literature, such as Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), shows that hedging can help a
firm avoid costly external financing by making cash flows less volatile.1 Hence, a firm
can ultimately increase its value by hedging because it can thus finance its investment
opportunities using less costly internal resources. The value effect of hedging has been
1The same argument extends to financial institutions, as demonstrated by Froot and Stein (1998).
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examined empirically (e.g., MacKay and Moeller, 2007 and Pérez-González and Yun,
2013), but results are mixed. At the very best, the value effect of financial derivatives
is modest, as evidenced by Guay and Kothari (2003), among others. While these
inconclusive results may be due to empirical challenges, it is also the case that hedging
may not being value–increasing. For instance, Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017) show
that if a firm’s growth opportunities are positively correlated with the cash flows and
the prospects are good, hedging actually jeopardizes the potential of expansion by
eliminating the chance of high cash flows. In this case, hedging reduces the value of
the growth options and of the firm. More generally, firms using financial derivatives
normally incur various endogenous costs (such as transaction costs, negotiation costs,
etc.) related to hedging, which offset its benefit (see for instance, Gamba and Triantis,
2014). Hence, there is a case for a more thorough re–examination of hedging as a
way to create value.
Second, hedging can have a direct effect on external financing costs by alle-
viating adverse selection issues. A consequence of informational asymmetry is that
outside investors require a premium upon new securities issuance when firms raise
external funds, as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984). In this respect, firms can
hedge to make their business more transparent, ultimately reducing the underpricing
cost of informationally sensitive securities, like equity. More precisely, by reducing
the amount of noise, hedging increases the informativeness of cash flow realizations
for outside investors, who can thereby make a more accurate inference on the value of
the firm. Hence, adverse selection costs for seasoned equity issuance will be lowered
when the firm taps financial markets. However, also in this respect hedging may have
a drawback. As illustrated by DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), by eliminating a source of
noise, hedging makes cash flows more informative and the public perception of a firm’s
value more sensitive to its performance. Holding fixed the variability of cash flows,
this implies that financing costs may become more variable. As they are typically
convex, this increases their present value, negatively affecting the value of the firm.
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Overall, this result in a negative incentive to hedging. In addition, as suggested by
Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), firms with bad news or low–quality projects might
prefer to increase risk exposure and hope for a lucky draw. In that case, revealing
the true quality makes low-quality firms worse–off. In sum, asymmetric information
does not create an obvious incentive to hedge.
I develop a two–period model in which a firm with a growth option can hedge
its exogenous risk by using financial instruments. As Babenko and Tserlukevich
(2017), the growth option is exercised subject to financing constraints. If the reserved
cash is insufficient to finance the investment, the firm must raise external capital to
cover the funding gap. If the exogenous risk is unhedged, outside investors cannot
directly observe the profitability and deduce the true profitability of the firm because
the exogenous risk factor makes the firm’s cash flow noisy. It is exactly when the
profitability is high (and investment likely), that the firm will be most exposed to
the undervaluation costs triggered by security issuance. Leaving the risk unhedged,
the firm will face an adverse selection cost when external funds are needed. Hence,
it is key that a high–profitability firm makes sure that its profitability is correctly
understood by the market, and that the exposure to the exogenous risk is managed.
The hedging instrument used by the firm is inherently costly because it insists on the
same resources used to finance the investment, in line with Rampini and Viswanathan
(2010). In this aspect, the opportunity cost of hedging is higher for a high–quality
firm. In addition, in some states, hedging would lower the value of the growth option
as described above, which in turn has a negative impact on the hedging incentive.
Unlike a full information setting, my model thus provides a rationale for why and
when firms will undertake hedging activities in an imperfect capital market. In this
respect, the model is closely related to Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), although
differently from them I do not need to discuss the firm’s reputation concerns.
The model shows that, when making hedging decisions, the firm should con-
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sider the severity of informational asymmetry issue, the perspective of its growth op-
portunity, and all inevitable (opportunity) costs caused by hedging. Optimal hedging
trades off the benefits of less-frequent and less-costly external financing with a better
ability to finance investment. Consequently, while it can be achieved, perfect hedging
of the exogenous risk is usually not optimal, especially when the firm profitability is
low, in line with Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). The model generates results consistent
with existing empirical observations, and the predictions of the model provide the
basis of further empirical analysis.
I perform in the last part of the chapter using a sample of hand–collected data
comprising 62 oil and gas (OG) firms in the United States from 2009 through 2018.
The data sample contains 557 firm–year observations. I use the nominal amount of
hedging in my definition of a continuous dependent hedging variable. Specifically, I
hand collect information on the volume of crude oil and equivalence products hedged
by financial derivatives, and scale the hedged volume by the firm’s production vol-
ume in the same year to construct hedge ratio. I supplement the financial hedging
data with accounting information from Compustat and CRSP databases. The panel
structure of the data allows me to exploit both cross–sectional and within–firm vari-
ation to assess the relationship between financial hedging and the focused variables.
Many previous studies use only cross–sectional data and hardly exploit within–firm
variation because they largely rely on dummy variables for financial hedging activities
that have only limited within–firm variation.
My theoretical model belongs to the growing literature on corporate risk man-
agement and real investment. The received theory shows that financing and hedging
are intrinsically intertwined, which creates conflicting incentives for hedging, as sug-
gested by Stulz (1996). Positive effects of hedging on corporate financing include (i)
reduction in costly external financing, as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993); (ii)
mitigation of cash flows noise, as in DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and DeMarzo and
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Duffie (1995); (iii) reduction in expected (convex) taxation and bankruptcy costs, as
in Smith and Stulz (1985); (iv) reduction of borrowing costs, as in Leland (1998); (v)
reduction in expected distress costs, as in Purnanandam (2008); and (vi) reduction
in contracting costs (with creditors, suppliers, and customers), as in Bessembinder
(1991). the chapter focus on the first two motives for hedging, although other motives
could be easily accommodated by extending the model. Differently from the other
models, I account for two negative economic forces that may reduce the hedging in-
centive. First, hedging is suboptimal when cash flow is positively correlated with
lumpy profitable investment, as in Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017). Second, in the
spirit of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), a firm
(and its executives) may not always intend to eliminate the informational asymmetry
with outside financiers.
The empirical findings support the predictions of the model. First, ceteris
paribus, firms with stronger ability to generate income should more likely engage
in financial hedging. Indeed, I find a strong and positive relation between a firm’s
profitability and hedging decision. Second, the hedging incentive should be positively
related to the severity of informational asymmetry, and I evidence a positive, although
decreasing, marginal effect of informational asymmetry on the likelihood of hedging.
Third, the potential external financing needs of a firm, resulting from the perspective
of exercising the growth opportunities, should increase the hedging incentive in the
presence of adverse selection costs. The empirical analysis confirms this prediction,
although the effect is economically modest. Fourth, as hedging is inherently costly,
it is less preferred by those firms whose capital resource constraint is tighter. By
using various proxies of hedging costs, I find evidence in support of a negative relation
between firms’ inability to accessing financial derivatives and their hedging incentives.
The empirical findings contribute to the empirical risk management literature
by analyzing corporate financial hedging activities of a comprehensive sample of OG
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firms. Since the reliability of disclosures on firms’ derivatives fair values for the
purpose of hedging remains doubtful, I investigate only the sample firms’ disclosure on
physical hedge ratio or nominal volume of commodity hedged, following a sizable prior
empirical literature, such as Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) and Rampini,
Viswanathan, and Vuillemey (2017). Some empirical studies use yes-no decision of
hedging as the dependent variable. For example, Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997)
use a 372 firms sample with 154 hedgers. Similarly, Graham and Rogers (2002) use
446 firms with 158 hedgers. Mian (1996), Purnanandam (2008), and Bartram, Brown,
and Fehle (2009) use large samples of categorical data on the hedging decision. Tufano
(1996) provide evidence from the gold mining industry. Haushalter (2000) and Pérez-
González and Yun (2013) focus on utility firms. Purnanandam (2007) analyzes the
effects of bank characteristics and macroeconomic shocks on the usage of interest rate
derivatives. In addition, Brown (2001) provides a clinical study to show why and how
a typical manufacturing firm engages in foreign exchange risk management. Differing
from the prior research, the results of my study emphasize the importance of growth
potential and information asymmetry on corporate incentives for financial hedging
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model, by illus-
trating the time line of events, the outsiders’ inferences on the firm’s profitability, and
the equilibrium hedging strategies that solves the firm’s value–maximization problem
and satisfies outsiders’ learning process. In Section 3.3, I numerically analyze the
optimal hedging policies of the firm and study how hedging decisions depends on the
parameters of the model. To close the section, I provide a self–contained summary
of theoretical predictions for my empirical estimations. Then, I empirically examine




To illustrate the main arguments, I introduce a simple two-period model featuring
key assumptions that relate to my research interest. In an economy with three dates,
t = 0, 1, 2, I assume a firm featuring real investments, financing frictions, and infor-
mational asymmetry between existing shareholders (hereinafter insiders), and public
investors in the capital market (hereinafter outsiders). I assume that borrowing is
excluded and that all financing needs can only be met by using internal reserves
and, when they are exhausted, by issuing equity to outsiders.2 By endogenizing the
external financing cost and outsiders’ inference on latent information, I determine
the equilibrium exercize of the growth option and the optimal hedging policy. I also
abstract from managerial agency issues, which are inessential to my argument.
3.2.1. Complete information case
I assume a firm (hereinafter the firm) having access to a production technology with
constant returns to scale. I denote kt the amount invested this technology in period
t. At t = 0, the firm is endowed with w0 units of capital input. A non–hedgeable
profitability shock, denoted θt > 0, affects the output in period t, which is therefore
θtkt, for t = 1, 2. I assume that the profitability shock remains constant over the
last two dates, θ1 = θ2 = θ, so that the information about profitability is revealed
at t = 1.3 In order to rule out the signalling concern, I assume that at t = 0, the
owner and outsiders of the firm share the same expectation on θt. Thus, there would
2This assumption is equivalent to a case where the firm could abscond with all cash flows and
would be excluded from future lending, see Rampini and Viswanathan (2010).
3Throughout this chapter, I focus on steady–state θ for the purpose of model simplicity. Never-
theless, intuitively, the technological quality of a firm could be time-varying due to changing market
conditions, such as preferences of consumers, competition of goods market, and launch of new inno-
vations, etc.
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be no information asymmetry issue regarding to the quality of the firm; that is, the
firm would not mimic any other type of firms at t = 0. In addition to production
shocks, each firm is also exposed to an idiosyncratic exogenous shock with symmetric
distribution, which yields a cash flow ϕt at the end of each period and has average
ϕm ≤ 0. Thus, the firm’s asset returns a total cash flow θtkt + ϕt, for t = 1, 2.
The exogenous shock can be hedged by purchasing one–period ahead Arrow–
Debreu securities. For instance, the firm may take at t − 1 a long position in a
one–period futures contract with price ϕm, in exchange of the obligation to deliver
ϕt at t.
4 Empirically, the ability of the firm to hedge its risk exposure using financial
derivatives is quite low.5 In the model this is rationalized by interpreting ϕ as any
hedgeable risks, and θt as whatever remaining non-hedgeable risks the firm is exposed
to.
At the beginning of each period, the firm makes a hedging decisions, summa-
rized by the hedge ratio ht ∈ [0, 1], for t = 1, 2. Trading Arrow-Debreu securities
entails a cost cht, proportional to the notional amount ht, for a constant c ≥ 0.6
The firm must pay in advance the Arrow-Debreu securities, and the maximal amount
of cash that can be put on hedging is kt, implying a budget constraint on hedging
instruments, cht ≤ kt.7
Given the state (kt, θt, ϕt) and the firm’s decision ht, the cash flow at the end
of period t is wt ≡ wt(ht, kt, θt, ϕt) = θt(kt − cht) + ϕt + ht(ϕm − ϕt), for t = 1, 2.
Without loss of generality, I assume: (i) ϕm = 0, (ii) zero discount rate; (iii) full
depreciation of productive capital; (iv) the capital input at t = 0 is w0 = k1 = 1.
4In the airline industry, as illustrated by Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), this corresponds
to locking in the jet-fuel cost.
5See empirical papers such as Graham and Rogers (2002), Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006),
Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010), Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011), and among others.
6One may interpret c as the negotiation costs or the interest loss in margin account, but I do not
need to endogenize this cost to derive the results.
7Bolton and Oehmke (2015) study the seniority for financial derivatives in bankruptcy. But this




wt = θt(kt − cht) + ϕt(1− ht) for t = 1, 2. (3.1)
The firm has the option to expand the productive asset at t = 1. That is,
at t = 1, θ1 = θ is realized and the firm decides whether to invest k2 in the growth
option. The expected payoff from the investment is E1[w2] = θ(k2−ch2) as E1[ϕ2] = 0
and E1[θ2] = θ, where Et[·] is the expectation operator conditional on information at
t. Clearly, the incentive it to choose k2 so that E1[w2] is as large as possible. On the
other hand, because there is no financing need at t = 2, ∂E1[w2]/∂h2 = −cθ < 0, so
that the firm has no incentive to hedge at t = 1. Hence, the payoff can be simplified
into E1[w2] = θk2, as h2 = 0.
The financing needs in t = 1 are motivated by investment. If the net worth
is greater than the investment cost, w1 ≥ k2, the firm uses the cash reserve w1 to
exercise the option and distribute the remaining cash, w1 − k2, to insiders. Because
internal financing is cheaper than external financing, it is easy to show that it is
optimal to use up all cash reserves before tapping the financial market. Hence, if
w1 < k2, to finance the shortfall the firm will raise k2 −w1 from outsiders, incurs the
financing cost which is proportional to the scale of issuance. Specifically, we denote
the dollar cost of external equity financing as
Λ(h1) ≡ Λ(w1, θ, k2, h1) =
α
θ
·max{k2 − w1(h1), 0}, (3.2)
where α = 1/k2 is a positive constant. To make the problem non–trivial, I assume
that the firm’s cost for accessing to debt is higher than Λ for any h1 thus that debt
is always a sub–optimal financing tool, comparing with equity. The firm forgoes the
investment opportunity if w1(h1) + Λ(h) > θk2, whereby investment and financing
costs exceed the expected payoff to insiders. Taking a deeper insight on how hedging
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Hence, ϕ1 determines whether h1 enhances or reduces the cost of external financing.
Specifically, when ϕ1 is greater (smaller) than−cθ, Λ is positively (negatively) affected
by h1. This is non–trivial in the sense that hedging drives external financing more
(less) costly when the realized exogenous shock is favorable (adverse). However, from
the perspective at t = 0, for E0[ϕ1] = 0, the marginal effect of h1 on E0[Λ] is always
non–negative.
Thus, the value of the growth option at t = 1 is
g1 ≡ g1(w1, θ, k2) = max
{
0,−k2 + θk2 − Λ(h1)χ{k2>w1}
}
,
where χ{E} is the indicator function of event E . The insiders’ value at t = 1, is
V1 ≡ V1(w1, θ, k2, h1) = w1 +

−k2 + θk2, if k2 ≤ w1,
−k2 − Λ(h1) + θk2, if w ≤ w1 < k2,
0, if w1 < w,
where w is the threshold for w1, above which the growth option is exercised. The
first and the second row of the above expression is the equity value when the option
is exercised, whereas the third row is the equity value when the option is forgone. By
equating the second and the third row of the above expression gives w = (2 − θ)k2.
Note that, if the realized profitability shock θ < 1, exercizing the growth option
always generates a loss to insiders as θk2 < k2, implying a negative-NPV project, and
thus the firm never exercizes the growth option. In fact, θ < 1 gives a counterfactual
condition that the lower bound of exercizing the growth option exceeds the investment
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cost, i.e. w > k2. Intuitively, if a firm’s ex post profitability is very low, its best choice
is abandoning the investment project and distributing all cash in-hand to insiders.
Restricting the consideration in θ ≥ 1, the expression of w entails three salient
points. First, for any k2 > 0, a firm with superior profitability has lower investment
constraint, w, and a higher probability of exercising the growth option. Second, w
increases in k2 for θ < 2, whereas w decreases in k2 if θ > 2. It implies that the effect
of k2 on the chance for investing at t = 1 depends on the firm’s ex post profitability.
Third, to investigate how h1 determines the likelihood of exercising the option, I re-
write w in the form of equation (3.1) and replace ϕ1 by ϕ1, where ϕ1 denotes the
realization of ϕ1 that gives w. By equating the new form of w and (2 − θ)k2 and




(2− θ)k2 + (ch1 − 1)θ
1− h1
.
It is straightforward that a larger ϕ
1
begets higher threshold w and thus lower possi-
bility for exercising the growth option. Clearly, the sign of ∂ϕ
1
/∂h1 is decided by the
association between θ and k2. Specifically, ∂ϕ1/∂h1 > 0 only if k2 > (1− c)θ/(2− θ),
which is easy to derive, and I do not show the details in the chapter.
The firm is, therefore, maximizing the insiders’ value as the expected first-
period cash flow plus the value of growth option at t = 0 by optimally choosing
hedging policy, h∗1. That is,







A numerical solution of the optimal hedging policy with complete information will be
shown in Section 3.3.
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3.2.2. Incomplete information with investors’ inferences
I now consider an alternative scenario, in which the firm’s profitability and the id-
iosyncratic shock are concealed to outsiders. More precisely, while the distributions
of θ and ϕ are publicly known, the realizations of θ and ϕ cannot be observed by
outside investors. I assume that firms disclose the hedging strategy, h1, but do not
truthfully convey the net payoff from the hedging contract.8 However, outsiders can
infer the actual realization of θ from the cash flows, on which basis they can price the
firm’s securities. Figure 3.1 depicts the timeline of the model.
w0 and k2 are
realized publicly
0
h1 ∈ [0, 1] is set,
ch1 is paid, and
w0 − ch1 is invested
θ and ϕ1 are
realized privately, and





pay dividend (w1 > k2)
issue equity (w ≤ w1 < k2)
distribute cash (w1 ≤ w)
invest k2 (w1 ≥ w)
ϕ2 is realized,
w2 is realized and
all cash is distributed
2
Figure 3.1: Timeline for the model
Notes: At t = 0, the firm makes hedging decision h, based on the endowment w0 and
the growth option k2 that can be exercised at t = 1. At t = 1, the firm observes θ and
ϕ1, and thus obtains w1; the investment decision depends on w1 and k2; the hedging
decision is zero. At t = 2, if the investment k2 is made at t = 1, the firm observes ϕ2
and obtains w2. All cash will be distributed to shareholders.
At t = 1, outsiders receive the following information: (i) the initial capital
input k1 = 1; (ii) the realized net worth, w1; (iii) the hedge ratio, h1. Outsiders infer
8See, for example, the survey paper by Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) for a review of
the literature on financial reporting.
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θ from w1. However, the presence of ϕ1 blurs the link between θ and w1, and investors








Because ϕm = 0, the average of x is θ and the estimation error is unbiased. The
random variable x can be interpreted as a noisy signal about θ, whose distribution is
publicly known.9
The assumed informational asymmetry becomes relevant if the firm needs ex-
ternal financing to exercise the growth option, at t = 1. In exchange for investment,
outsiders require a fraction of equity stake, which is regarded as a financing cost by
the insiders. In the extreme case of h1 = 0, the estimate is as inaccurate as it can be,
because outsiders cannot tell if a high (low) realization of w1 is due to a high (low)
profitability, θ, or a small (large) payoff of the exogenous shock, ϕ1. In the other
extreme case, if a firm fully hedges (h1 = 1), the exogenous shock is eliminated, as
ξ = 0. Hence, investors can perfectly tell the profitability of the firm from the net
worth, and price its issuance accordingly. The resulting financing cost, based on the
firm’s actual profitability, is identical to the issuance cost in the complete-information
scenario in the previous section.
For 0 < h1 < 1, outsiders can observe relatively smooth w1 but cannot derive
the true θ. The following lemma states sufficient conditions for the accuracy of the
estimate of θ to depend on the hedge ratio.10
Lemma 3.1. Assume outsiders infer the firm’s profitability, θ, based on the real-
izations of net worth w1. Suppose θ is drawn from a truncated normal distribution
N (µ, η2; 0) with open support (0,∞), and ϕ has normal distribution N (0, σ2), where
9One may think of x as corresponding to, for example, analysts’ estimate of the firm’s cash flow.
10The proof is in Appendix 3.6.1. Some derivations rely on special knowledge on pure mathematics
theories, such as Barr and Sherrill (1999) and Jawitz (2004).
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σ = 1. Then, for h ∈ [0, 1), the inference, or the posterior belief, on θ drawn by
outside investors has mean of














and φ(·) and Φ(·) are respectively the density and the cumulative probability functions
of standard normal distribution. If the firm adopts a hedge ratio approaching to one,
h1 ↑ 1, then the signal revealed from realized cash flows is less noisy, x → θ, and
(thus) the posterior mean approaches a perfect inference, i.e. θ̂ → θ.
The essence of drawing inferences on θ is a Bayesian approach to specify the
posterior distribution of θ with mean θ̂, known as the outsiders’ learning process.
Notably, I define µ ≡ E0[θ] the ex ante profitability, which is the unconditional
mean of θ at t = 0 known by both insiders and outsiders. Moreover, without loss of
generality, I assume that the volatility of the exogenous risk factor is σ = k1 = 1,
which reflects the scale of the firm’s exposure to ϕ. In the limiting case of a firm that
fully hedges, the noise around x becomes zero, which results in a perfect inference on
θ, as θ̂ equals x = θ. In general, the higher the hedge ratio the better the inference
on the profitability of the firm that the outsiders will make. Investors then price
the equity issued by the firm and require a fraction of equity stake based on their
inference on θ. Therefore, the dollar cost of flotation charged by the outsiders is
Λ(h1) ≡ Λ(w1, θ̂, k2, h1) =
α
θ̂
·max{k2 − w1(h1), 0}. (3.5)
Equation (3.5) reflects the outsiders’ informational gain from their learning.
By comparing equation (3.2) in the complete–information scenario to equation (3.5),
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one may see that an additional risk of being undervalued exists when the firm raises
external funds. Such risk can also be referred to as an adverse selection problem in
capital market. Financial hedging reduces cash–flow noise and thus alleviates the
severity of the potential adverse selection problem. Hence, once the informational
asymmetry concern is taken into consideration, the additional incentives for hedging
comes from the transparency-enhancing potential of hedging. Consequently, the value
of the growth option at t = 1 becomes
g1(h1, θ, θ̂, k2) = max
{






The last term in the above equation is the subsidy from insiders to outsiders. Clearly,
as a result of informational asymmetry, when the firm raises external funds by issuing
equity, it is undervalued by outsiders, if the ex post profitability shock is superior
θ > θ̂, and overvalued if θ < θ̂.
In my model, in line with Wilson (1980), investors are assumed to be risk-
neutral with respect to the firm’s profitability. Outsiders price the equity based
on the inferred profitability of the firm. Therefore, by actively choosing the hedge
ratio, the firm can potentially bias the outsiders’ inference process and thus indirectly
controls the external financing cost. Of course, in equilibrium this will not happen,
because the investors in market will know what to expect and adjust the expectation,
which is noisy though, accordingly.
To summarize, because the firm maximizes the value of insiders, the valuation
equation at t = 0 is







θ(1− ch1) + (1− h1)ϕ1
+ max
{
0,−k2 + θk2 −
θ
θ̂




The first line of (3.6) reflects (i) the limited liability of insiders, (ii) the expected
payoff from hedging activity, and (iii) the expected net worth at t = 1. The second
line is the expected value of the growth option, as well as the cost of external financing
if the new investment exceeds the contemporaneous net worth.
The optimal hedge ratio h∗1(θ̂) solves the program in (3.6) and satisfies out-
siders’ inference process in (3.4). Any deviation h′1 6= h∗1 is suboptimal for insiders
because it yields a lower value. Moreover, the firm manipulates the outsiders’ learning
process by altering the hedge ratio, which is a key feature of my model.
Equation (3.6) enable us to show the fundamental forces that determine the
firm’s risk management decision. First, on the one hand, hedging helps the firm avoid
the costly external finance in the state where a negative ϕ lowers the operating cash
flows, but on the other, hedging may result in a lower valuation of the firm’s growth
option because it mitigates the possibility of high cash–flow realizations. This would
suggest executives to reduce hedging. Second, the financial instrument itself is of non–
zero costs so that the firm hedges only if the benefit of doing so dominates the costs. If
the firm expects a high profitability shock occurring in the future, the opportunity cost
of hedging becomes higher, which lowers the ex ante incentive for hedging. Third, the
transparency–enhancing potential of hedging favors the firm. However, hedging makes
it less possible that the firm would enjoy a benefit from the outsiders’ overvaluation.
To that extent, in line with DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), when the realized cash flow
is a more informative signal of its profitability, outsiders’ perception of the firm’s
profitability is more sensitive to its performance. As a consequence, hedging makes
the firm entirely exposed to the profitability shock that cannot be hedged. Such effect
in fact reduces the incentive to hedge.
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3.3. Numerical implementations
To help the model intuition, I solve a calibrated model to explore the impact of
hedging and examine the policy function, h∗1, because the numerical results are more
revealing in my model. I analyze the marginal benefit of hedging and exhibit the asso-
ciation between firm characteristics and optimal hedging policy. The parameters for
the base case environment are µ =1.3, η =1.0, k2 =1.9, and c =4%. In my analysis,
I also investigate the effects of varying these parameters other than their base case
values. Notably, the unconditional volatility, η, can be regarded as a measure of the
severity of informational asymmetry. A firm with large η faces severe informational
asymmetry problem because large variance in profitability shock implies large likeli-
hood of being misvalued when it issues equity to outsiders. The numerical procedure
can be found in Appendix 3.6.2.
3.3.1. Value contributions of hedging
To gain an appreciation of the relative contributions of hedging to value creation
in different states, I begin by studying the marginal effect of hedge ratio on the
firm’s equity value and growth option value, respectively. Figure 3.2 demonstrates
the complete-information and the incomplete–information value functions against all
possible hedge levels, h1. The left column of panels contains the firm’s equity values,
and the right column contains the growth option values. The first row of panels
corresponds to the base case valuation, and apart from that, I plot four interesting
scenarios with different firm characteristics: (i) The firm has low ex ante profitability
so that its growth option is very unlikely to be exercised; (ii) the firm has a severe
informational asymmetry concern as its profitability shock is highly volatile; (iii) the
firm’s next-period investment project is of small scale so that its external financing
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need is potentially small; and (iv) the firm’s access to financial derivatives market
is very costly. In each row, the optimal hedge ratio that maximizes insiders’ value
corresponds to the peak of the firm equity value curves.
Overall, model results plotted in Figure 3.2 are consistent with the conjectures.
Firstly, looking across the graphs, the optimal hedge ratio exists as insiders’ equity
value is concave in h1, showing that the firm trades off the benefits and costs associated
with hedging. As expected, hedging alleviates the information asymmetry problem,
which is shown by the decreasing difference between the complete–information and
the incomplete-information equity values as h1 increases. When h1 = 1 (i.e. fully
hedging), the two models are fully aligned. It is noteworthy that, although a high
hedge ratio is normally favorable to the growth option value, such a high hedge level
does not always optimize equity value.
Secondly, apparently the dash–dotted line dominates the solid line, and the
two function curves are of different shapes, indicating that informational asymmetry
structurally reduces equity value and alters the marginal contribution of hedging. It
implies that informativeness concern plays an essential role in corporate risk manage-
ment policies, which is in contrast to traditional full information models that whether
firms hedge or not is irrelevant.11 In fact, the complete-information model is another
manifestation of the model proposed by Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017) in which in-
formation is symmetric. With certain parameter combinations, the results are fairly
in line with their argument that hedging is not favorable to firm value when the
growth option is taken into account. However, when information is asymmetric, the
firm would hedge more aggressively than in the complete-information environment.
Thirdly, the marginal value of hedging appears to be quite state specific, re-
flecting a variety of factors. Looking at the second row of panels, it can be clearly
11For example, by proposing a full information model, Culp and Miller (1995) assert that “most
value maximizing firms do not, in fact, hedge.”
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Figure 3.2: Marginal value of hedging
Notes: The figure depicts the values of equity and growth option against hedging
policy at t = 0. The panels on the left plot the equity values, and the panels on
the right plot the growth option values. The dash–dotted lines represent the value
functions in the complete–information scenario, and the solid lines are the value
functions in the incomplete-information scenario. The base–case parameterization is:
(i) µ = 1.3, (ii) η = 1.0, (iii) k2 = 1.9, and (iv) c = 4%.
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seen that the firm hedges less aggressively when µ is very low. This is consistent with
Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) that firms, or executives, with low qualities do not
hedge. The third row shows that both firm equity and growth option values are lower
than the baseline model, given η is higher than its base-case setting, but the marginal
contribution of hedging is not significantly different from the base case. The fourth
row illustrates a scenario in which the next-period investment costs less capital than
in the base case so that the firm is more likely to finance the investment by internal
reserves. Not surprisingly, the firm does not hedge if information is symmetric, but
hedges if information is asymmetric, showing that the transparency-enhancing effect
of hedging is overwhelming. In the bottom row, the hedging cost is much higher
than its base-case setting, and as expected, hedging is suboptimal because it imposes
higher opportunity cost, making capital input scarcer.
3.3.2. Policy functions
In this section, I examine the hedging policy function, h∗1. Figure 3.3 sketches the
optimal hedge ratio on the vertical axis to a particular parameter on the horizontal
axis. The baseline parameterization is identical to that used to construct Figure 3.2.
We let each of the estimated parameters take values in a range whose center is roughly
its baseline setting: µ ∈ [0.5, 2.1], η ∈ [0.2, 1.8], k2 ∈ [1.2, 2.6], and c ∈ [0, 0.08].
Five remarks are in order. First, looking across the four panels, despite it can be
achieved, perfect immunization against the exogenous risk is usually not optimal. In
a sense, this is akin to some standard theories that firms maximize the values of their
assets by leaving, at least part of, their profits unhedged. For example, the closed-
form optimal hedging ratios in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) and Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2013) imply that partial hedging strategies could be de facto optimal.
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Figure 3.3: Hedging policy functions
Notes: The figure depicts the optimal policy of hedge ratio, h∗1, in response to the
ex–ante profitability of the firm µ, the unconditional volatility of profitability η, the
scale of new project k2, the hedging cost factor c, respectively. The dash–dotted lines
are optimal hedging policies for the complete–information model, while the solid lines
are optimal hedging policies for the incomplete–information model. The base–case
parameterization is: (i) µ = 1.3, (ii) η = 1.0, (iii) k2 = 1.9, and (iv) c = 4%.
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Second, in the complete–information model, the hedging incentive increases
with the ex–ante profitability. Intuitively, a high-expected-net-worth firm has large
µ and sufficient financing for the new project in most, but not all, cases. Hedging
is thus desirable for such a firm because it increases the cash flow in bad states, in
which investment would otherwise be less possible, and meanwhile preserves the level
of internal funds in good states. In contrast, smaller µ implies lower expected net
worth at t = 1 for the firm, and hedging effectively moves cash away from good to bad
states. As a consequence, hedging is actually value-destroying, and higher risk expo-
sure is optimal at low net worth as suggested by Rampini and Viswanathan (2010)
and Rampini and Viswanathan (2013). This result is also consistent with empiri-
cal observations in Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), without relying on the
potential financing needs and the costs of risk management.12 The positive relation
between µ and h∗1 is less obvious for the incomplete–information model, showing that
informativeness concern dominates in this case.
Third, it is interesting that hedge ratio responds sharply to small η but then
decreases gradually with large η. The intuition behind the results revolves around
the main idea that hedging policy depends critically on the uncertainty of profitabil-
ity shock which is also a measurement of the severity of informational asymmetry.
Overall, the complete–information function shows that firms with safe assets (very
small η) choose to hedge more aggressively than firms with risky assets (large η),
which coincides with Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017). The incomplete-information
function, however, is more informative. Intuitively, as η rises, the firm is more likely
to observe an extreme realization of the profitability shock and thus more likely to be
misvalued. In turn, the firm is more motivated to reveal its true profitability if there
is a server concern that its issued equity is undervalued. On the other hand, when
effective hedging eliminates the noise from the firm’s cash flow, outsiders’ perceptions
12In fact, Rampini, Viswanathan, and Vuillemey (2017) empirically study the financial hedging
activities in financial industry and draw a conclusion that less constrained institutions hedge more,
which is reversing from the evidence found by Rampini and Viswanathan (2013).
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of θ are more sensitive to the firm’s realized performance at t = 1, as DeMarzo and
Duffie (1995) assert. In other words, by effectively hedging, the firm eventually ex-
poses more on the unhedgable profitability shock, which is to the detriment of the
firm, especially when η is large. As a consequence, large η destroys the incentive for
effective hedging.
Fourth, I consider the parameter k2 that governs the scale of the next-period
investment opportunity. In the complete–information case, the firm’s optimal hedg-
ing policy is of a bell shape rather than a monotonic relation as in Rampini and
Viswanathan (2010). This is because in my model, the strike price of investment is
exogenously given as k2, while the up–front investment is endogenously determined
in Rampini–Viswanathan model. In other words, the key decision at t = 1 made by
the firm in my case is on whether or not to invest, whereas the key decision made by
the firm in Rampini–Viswanathan case at t = 1 is on how much to invest. However,
in the incomplete-information scenario, overall, the optimal hedging ratio for each
firm is monotonically increasing with k2. Intuitively, it suggests that financing needs
override hedging costs and subsequent concerns. That is, when the firm may only be
able to seize expansion opportunity by external financing as a result of (relatively)
low net worth, the optimal action could be taken by the firm is minimizing exter-
nal financing cost, which can be achieved by hedging to reduce the cash-flow noise.
Therefore, I expect that companies holding large-scale investment options but having
severe informational asymmetry problem would hedge more aggressively.
Finally, the right–bottom panel in Figure 3.3 indicates a negative relationship
between the firm’s hedging incentive and the hedging cost. Not surprisingly, when
hedging actions are too costly, the firm’s incentive for hedging is completely elimi-
nated. The complete–information policy function responds more sharply to c than
the incomplete-information model. Intuitively, this is because the firm has incentive
for using hedging instruments to alleviate the informational asymmetry problem in
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the incomplete–information case, whereas the problem and the consequent hedging
incentive never occur in the symmetric-information case.
3.3.3. Summary of model predictions
According to the stylized model, corporate incentive for hedging or risk management
is a trade–off between the risk–shifting and the risk–avoidance effects, which is con-
sistent with Purnanandam (2008).13 However, Purnanandam mainly focuses on the
risk management caused by the presence of financial distress costs, whereas the model
suggests that firms’ hedging motivations are essentially provided by potential financ-
ing needs and the subsequent costs of hedging. As a consequence, the predictions of
my model have some empirical implications that differs from Purnanandam (2008).
I highlight four important predictions as follows.
First, ceteris paribus, firms with stronger abilities to generate incomes engage
in financial hedging more aggressively because they are less likely to be financially
constrained. As a result, the model predicts a positive relation between the firm’s
hedging decision and its profitability, or ability to generate incomes.
Second, corporate incentives for hedging are positively related to the severity
of informational asymmetry problem, or the severity of potential adverse selection,
facing the firm.14 However, the model predict a decreasing marginal effect of the
severity of informational asymmetry on hedging incentives, since the firm would enjoy
potential over–valuation in extreme cases.
Third, the firm’s potential financing needs positively affects its hedging in-
13See risk-shifting models such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Babenko and Tserlukevich
(2017), and risk-avoidance models such as Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1993).
14Fauver and Naranjo (2010) empirically examine the association between firms value and deriva-
tive usage when firms have monitoring concerns. Unlike their work that focuses on how hedging
affects firms value, the interest is mainly on how likely firms hedges.
71
centive. Firms with financial needs would incur issuance costs (including adverse
selection costs) when they raise funds externally.15 In turn, firms with more expan-
sion opportunities and severe informational asymmetry concerns are expected to be of
higher incentives for hedging. This prediction is due to two reasons: (i) hedging can
help them avoid costly external financing; and (ii) hedging increases their financial
transparency and so reduces the adverse selection costs when they issue securities.
Fourth, the inevitable costs imposed on the firm by hedging activities reduces
the firm’s hedging incentive. A related empirical paper discussing hedging costs and
associated incentives is by Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013). However,
their insight is on the commodity market and commodity futures market, which falls
outside this research scope.
3.4. Empirical evidence and discussions
This section begin with discussing the sample construction and data collection pro-
cedure, and empirical results follow these discussions. I test the key predictions of
my theory by examining commodity price hedging activities in the oil and gas (OG)
industry. The data sample is based on hand–collected information from the United
States OG firms’ 10–K Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing. The OG
industry offers an excellent laboratory for the following reasons. First, as in my
model, the commodity (i.e. crude oil and natural gas) price volatility represents a
major source of cash flow risk for OG firms. Second, more detailed data on the extent
of financial hedging are available from OG firms’ 10–K SEC filings than from those
for other firms. In particular, the time–series dimension of my panel data on the
extent of financial hedging, as opposed to only data on whether or not firms hedge,
allows me to study the within–firm relation between hedging activity and focused
15Normally, external financing is expensive to firms, see Hennessy and Whited (2007).
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quantities. Third, OG firms are required to disclose their annual production volume
as well as total proved underground reserves of crude oil and natural gas, which pro-
vides an ideal proxy of the firm’s growth potentials. Fourth, focusing on one industry
holds constant characteristics of the economic environment that vary across indus-
tries. In particular, this sample selection limits my analysis to only those firms that
have well–defined exposures to oil and natural gas prices risk.
3.4.1. Sample selection and hedging data
I draw my data sample based on the U.S. companies in the intersection of Compustat
and CRSP. An OG firm is defined as any company that has reported a Standard In-
dustrial Classification (SIC) code of 1311 or 1382 on a 10–K filing from 2009 through
2018. The sample period is chosen because, from 2009, most OG firms adopted a revi-
sion to ASC 815 ”Derivatives and Hedging” which requires more detailed information
about hedging transactions including the location and effect on the primary consoli-
dated financial statements. Since I rule out the bankruptcy effect in my theoretical
model, I only choose firms that are solvent during the period 2009–2018.
Next, I collect the accounting information of all the selected OG firms from
Compustat’s Fundamentals Annual File and CRSP’s Monthly Stock File. I exclude
the firm-year observations whose annual sales amount below $7.5 million.16 Dolde
(1993) and Nance, Smith Jr, and Smithson (1993) suggest that such small firms
are very unlikely to use financial derivatives for hedging purposes due to the lack
of economies of scale, which falls out of the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, I
remove all observations with missing values for total assets, the gross capital stock
value, market value, total sales, and stocks monthly closing prices.
16In the United States, the Small Business Administration generally specifies a small business as
having less than $7.5 million in annual revenues. See details on https://www.sba.gov/.
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For the remaining firms, the information on their annual production volume,
nominal hedging volume, and total proved reserves are hand-collected from the 10–K
report archived in SEC’s EDGAR database. OG firms are required to disclose their
production and proved reserves each year, measured at barrels of oil equivalence (boe)
or thousand cubic feet of natural gas equivalence (mfce), in the beginning section of
10–K reports.17 I obtain the financial hedging data by by searching the entire 10–K
filings for the following text strings: “hedg”, “derivative”, “instrument”, “nominal”,
and “commodity price risk”. If a reference is made to any of these key words, I read
the surrounding text to obtain the nominal volume data on commodity derivatives.
If the firm’s hedge ratio is available in the context, the ratio will be used directly. If
the firm only discloses the nominal volume hedged, its hedge ratio is then computed
as the nominal volume scaled by its production volume. If the firm claims that
its hedging activity is ineffective, the firm-year observation will be classified as a
non-hedger with zero hedge ratio. Examples of OG firms’ disclosures about various
mechanisms for commodity price hedging are shown in the Appendix 3.6.3. If there
are no references to the key words, the firm-year observation will be removed. My
methodology of collecting the data is similar to Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006)
and Purnanandam (2008).
Finally, I drop off firms having hedging data for less than five years, as I study
only firms that remain in the sample for a sufficiently long period. This restriction
allows me focus on within–firm variation. Observations with over 100% hedge ratios
are removed in order to rule out speculation incentives. After the above screens,
the data sample I use in the analysis covers 62 OG firms for a total sample of 557
firm–year observations.
17In computing boe, natural gas is converted to equivalent barrels of oil using a ratio of six thousand




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics as well as the definitions of Compustat-
based variables. Across 557 observations, the average fraction of each year’s produc-
tion hedged is 39.62%, which is exactly the median of the distribution. The nominal
volume of oil equivalence hedged is 19.72 million boe on average. The average pro-
duction volume is 69.17 million boe and the average proved reserves is 772.21 million
boe each year, implying that the crude oil equivalence reserves is approximately 11
times as much as production, for the OG companies in the sample.
3.4.2. Explanatory variables
I consider empirical proxies for the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of
my regression, motivated by prior literature. First, I measure a firm’s profitability by
using the earnings before interests and taxes (Compustat item: EBIT) to lagged mar-
ket value (Compustat item: MKVALT) ratio, i.e. ROE. As documented by Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), such revenue–based output measures are ubiqui-
tous and standard in micro-data.18 Indeed, the firm’s profitability θ in the theoretical
model, conceptually, refers to as the traditional revenue–based profitability combining
both technological efficiency of the firm’s plants or labour and the impact of market
demands or prices. Prior literature, Asplund and Nocke (2006) for example, suggest
that businesses with higher revenue, and thus with higher revenue–based profitability,
are more likely to survive in the market. I, hence, employ this revenue–based measure
of profitability as a measure of a firm’s ability to generate revenues.
Second, I employ a firm’s market liquidity, i.e. the percentage bid–ask spreads
of individual equity securities traded in capital markets, as a proxy for informa-
tional asymmetry. Prior empirical studies use (percentage) bid–ask spreads to mea-
18Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) precisely compare revenue–based profitability mea-
sures with measures of physical efficiency, which is beyond the scope of my study.
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sure firms’ informational asymmetry and suggest that accounting disclosure positively
links to (percentage) bid-ask spreads as well as their informational asymmetry prob-






ask pricet − bid pricet
(ask pricet + bid pricet)/2
× 100, (3.7)
which considers the closing ask price and the closing bid price of each month of a
firm’s calendar year, respectively. Unlike other accounting information, the data of
market liquidity are obtained from CRSP Monthly Stock File.
Third, I use the proved reserves to production ratio (growth) as a proxy for
a firm’s growth potential each year. It measures how many years remaining under-
ground reserves can be exhausted if the company keeps the current drifting speed
without discovering new fields. Earlier studies including Purnanandam (2008) use
market-to-book ratio (mtb) as a control variable for a firm’s growth opportunities.
I use the Compustat items (CSHO×PRCC C) scaled by the Compustat item SEQ
to construct the market-to-book ratio for the firms in the sample. However, market-
to-book ratio is also taken as a measure of firm value in several corporate finance
studies, and firm value may itself depend on hedging decision in my case. Hence, I
rather use market-to-book ratio as an alternative control variable for measuring the
scarcity of the firm’s capital input.
Fourth, I use net worth (Compustat item: SEQ) to total assets (Compustat
item: AT) ratio as an inverse proxy for the cost of hedging. Rampini and Viswanathan
(2010) show that purchasing hedging instruments is more costly for firms with low net
worth due to their collateral scarcity, which is empirically supported by Rampini, Sufi,
and Viswanathan (2014) using airline companies’ hedging data. In my model, scarce
capital implies costly hedging activities, in line with Rampini and Viswanathan’s
19See Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Welker (1995), Affleck-Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti
(2002), Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen (2005), and among others.
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model setting. Thus, following Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), I expect that
the net worth to assets ratio has a positive relation with hedging incentives.
Moreover, I use the ratio between total liabilities and total assets net of cash to
proxy the firm’s leverage. Purnanandam (2008) shows that leverage is an important
positive effect on commodity hedging activities. Also, I use the natural log value of
the firm’s sales revenues (Compustat item: SALE) to capture the pursuit of economies
of scale, as in Dolde (1993) and Purnanandam (2008). Prior literature, Dolde (1993)
for instance, suggests that large firms are the majority of derivatives users (exclusive
of financial firms). In addition, I use Whited-Wu (WW) index as a control variable
measuring the firm’s financial constraint. As in Whited and Wu (2006), the WW
index is computed as
WW i,t =− 0.091CF i,t − 0.062DIVPOS i,t + 0.021TLTD i,t
− 0.044LNTAi,t + 0.102ISG t − 0.035SG i,t, (3.8)
where CFi,t is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, DIV POSi,t is an indicator that
takes the value of one if the firm pays positive dividends, LTLDi,t is the ratio of the
long-term debt to total assets, LNTAi,t is the natural log of total assets, ISGt the
OG industry sales growth, and SGi,t is the firm’s sales growth.
20 As a financially
constrained firm is conjectured to have lower ability to access financial market, the
WW index is expected to have a negative effect on hedging.
20In this chapter, CF = (IB+DP )/AT is the income before extraordinary items plus depreciation
to total assets. DIV POS equals one if the total dividends DV T > 0. TLTA = DLTT/AT is the
long-term debt to total assets. LNTA = log(AT ). ISG is computed based on the sum of sales of
all the firms with 3-digit SIC code 131. SGi,t = SALEi,t/SALEi,t−1 − 1 is the firm’s current sales
divided by the lagged sales minus one.
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3.4.3. Univariate tests
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables across hedgers
and non–hedgers. To prevent outliers from affecting my empirical analysis, all ex-
planatory variables are winsorized at 1% from both tails. In Panel A, I report the
number of sample firms that use financial derivatives for hedging purposes and the
number of sample firms that do not hedge. In Panel B, I present the mean character-
istics, with the standard errors in parentheses, for hedger and non–hedger groups as
well as the entire sample. In the last column I provide p–values for differences in vari-
ables between hedger and non–hedger groups. I explore these effects more carefully
in the multivariate regression models.
Through the univariate tests, I find that the hedgers have significantly different
characteristics from the non–hedgers. First, the hedgers are overall more profitable
than the non–hedgers. Second, the hedgers are significantly larger, maturer firms, as
expected. In particular, firms using financial hedging instruments have significantly
higher total sales (sale) and smaller market-to-book ratios (mtb). Third, the hedger
firms have higher net worth ratio (nwbv), consistent with the findings of Rampini,
Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014). Fourth, the hedgers have higher leverages, in line with
Purnanandam (2008). Fifth, the WW index (WW ) shows that hedgers are overall
less financially constrained as compared with the non-hedgers. Sixth, surprisingly,
hedgers have lower average percentage bid–ask spread (persprd) and lower growth
potential (growth). However, the standard deviations of non–hedgers’ persprd and
growth are much larger than that of hedgers. Thus, I include variables capturing the
marginal effects of persprd and growth in the main regression model.
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Non-hedgers Hedgers All p-value
Panel A: Identifications
Number of observations 98 459 557 –
Panel B: Characteristics
ROE −.0312 0.0106 0.0032 0.0088
(0.0204) (0.0068) (0.0067) –
persprd 0.7142 0.2305 0.3156 <0.01
(0.1056) (0.0269) (0.0299) –
growth 32.62 14.08 17.34 <0.01
(5.388) (0.3174) (1.024) –
nwbv 0.4180 0.4902 0.4307 0.0208
(0.0126) (0.0485) (0.0135) –
sale −1.673 −.0783 −.3591 <0.01
(0.2052) (0.0873) (0.0845) –
mtb 2.252 2.037 2.074 0.2696
(0.3978) (0.1378) (0.1332) –
lev 0.2437 0.4276 0.3952 0.0387
(0.0565) (0.0132) (0.0150) –
WW −.3001 −.3930 −.3767 <0.01
(0.0132) (0.0053) (0.0052) –
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics at firm-year level for the 62 oil
& gas companies in the sample. The sample is constructed based on Compustat
Fundamental Annual File and CRSP Monthly Stock File. Panel A provides the
number of sample firms that use financial derivatives for hedging purposes between
2009 to 2018. Panel B exhibits the mean characteristics, with the standard errors
in parentheses, for hedger and non-hedger groups as well as the entire sample. The
last column reports p-values for differences in variables between hedger and non-
hedger groups. In the first column of Panel B, ROE stands for the EBIT to lagged
market value, EBIT/MKVALT(lagged); persprd stands for the annual percentage bid-
ask spread of the firm’s equity securities traded in capital markets, computed as in
equation (3.7); growth represents the proved reserves to production ratio of the firm;
nwbv is the net worth to total asset ratio, SEQ/AT; sale represents the log of total
sales in billion U.S. Dollar, log(SALE/1000); mtb stands for the market-to-book ratio,
(CSHO×PRCC C)/SEQ; lev stands for the leverage, (DLTT+LCT−CH)/(AT−CH);
WW represents the Whited-Wu index, defined as in equation (3.8).
80
3.4.4. Regression analysis
To keep the empirical estimation as tightly linked to the theoretical model as possible,
I estimate the following regression to test my theory:
HRi,t = β0 + β1ROE i,t + β2persprd i,t + β3persprd
2
i,t
+ β4growth i,t + β5growth
2
i,t + β6nwbv i,t +
∑
γXi,t + εi,t, (3.9)
where HRi,t denotes the hedge ratio of firm i at year t, definitions and constructions of
focused explanatory variables refer to Section 3.4.2, and X contains relevant control
variables. On the left–hand side, HR is the fraction of production hedged by financial
derivatives. Our theory predicts a positive relation between a firm’s ability to generate
incomes (ROE )), information asymmetry (persprd), potential of expansion (growth),
and hedging decision. Therefore, I expect a positive sign of β1, β2, and β4. A large
net worth to assets ratio stands for less costly hedging, and thus I expect a positive
sign of β6. Hence, I develop the following four key hypotheses that link the model
predictions and empirical setting.
Hypothesis 1 : β1 > 0 vs. β1 = 0, i.e. positive effect of ROE.
Hypothesis 2 : β2 > 0 vs. β2 = 0, i.e. positive effect of persprd.
Hypothesis 3 : β4 > 0 vs. β4 = 0, i.e. positive effect of growth.
Hypothesis 4 : β6 > 0 vs. β6 = 0, i.e. positive effect of nwbv.
In addition, to capture and investigate the effect of extreme information asym-
metry and growth potential on hedging decision, I include persprd2 and growth2 as
an additional explanatory variable in the base regression model. As predicted by my
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall, the regression results are in line with the theoretical arguments. I
present the regression results in Table 3.3. In Table 3.3, the first regression, labeled
as model (I), is the basic model with random effects for examining my theory. The
second regression, labeled as model (II), accommodates year–fixed effects. All obser-
vations are clustered into groups based on years. Fixing time effect is important for a
sample from oil and gas industry because it isolates the effects of any industry–wide
shocks, such as the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill in 2010 and the Paris Climate Accord in
2016. The third regression, labeled as model (III), further accommodates additional
control variables examining the interactions between ROE, growth and persprd. The
fourth regression, labeled as model (IV), further accommodates size–fixed effects.
Specifically, firms are clustered into three groups based on their total assets, in order
to better isolate the effect of economical scale.21
First of all, in each regression model, the positive and significant estimated
coefficient on ROE evidently verifies my first theoretical prediction that a firm’s
hedging is positively affected by its profitability. This is consistent with the finding
of Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) who use operating incomes to lagged assets
as an income-based measure and find a positive relation between hedging and firm’s
income. In regression model (III), I find the coefficient on the interaction of ROE
with percentage spread to be positive and significant at 2% level. Notably, including
the interaction term does not reduce the significance of β1. These results support the
prediction that information asymmetry would positively interact with profitability
effect on hedging.
As expected, the proxy of informational asymmetry, persprd, is positive and
persprd2 is negative. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Pur-
nanandam (2008) uses institutional shareholdings as an inverse proxy of informational
asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders, and finds positive relation between
21While within–firm clustering is usually used for regressions with firm fixed–effects, for a sample
of firms all from oil and gas industry, cross–firm clustering would be a rather reasonable assumption.
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institutional ownership and hedging. In contrast, my finding is consistent with infor-
mational asymmetry-based theories, such as Breeden and Viswanathan (2016), that
firms with severer informational asymmetry would be more aggressive to hedge. How-
ever, the negative sign on persprd2 represents a decreasing marginal effect of annual
percentage spread on hedging decision, pointing toward a concave relation between
informational asymmetry and hedging of a firm, consistent with the second prediction
given by the model.
The third theoretical prediction tells a positive effect of growth options on
the likelihood of hedging. From the regressions, I find a positive, but modest, re-
lation between hedging decision and firm’s growth opportunities whose coefficient is
positive and significant in the first three regression models. This is also consistent
with the theory of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and the empirical findings
of Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997). The negative coefficient on growth2 shows
that the hedging incentive decreases with extremely large growth potentials, which
is partly in line with the theory of Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017) that growth
options could reduce hedging. However, the coefficients on growth and growth2 lack
of economical significance, which implies a probably more complicated relation per se
between growth potentials and hedging incentives.
Full information models discussing hedging and growth opportunities, includ-
ing Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017), do
not integrate informational asymmetry in the analysis, while incomplete information
models of hedging such as Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) rarely coordinate the
influence of real growth options. However, the interaction of firm’s growth option
and informational asymmetry is apparently important for hedging decision. Regres-
sion (III) includes the interaction of percentage bid-ask spread and growth potentials.
Surprisingly, I find a negative coefficient on the interaction of persprd with growth.
Introduction of this interaction variable does not lower the significance of growth po-
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tential. This finding does not support my theoretical prediction that informational
asymmetry induces firms with more hedging incentives.
Consistent with Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), I find a positive re-
lation between the net worth to total assets ratio and hedging. This positive relation
is both statistically and economically significant. As nwbv is an inverse proxy for
hedging cost, it is in line with the fourth theoretical prediction that firms with higher
hedging costs would be less likely to hedge. Additionally, as the alternative proxies of
hedging cost, market-to-book ratio and WW index are negatively related to hedging,
although their coefficients lack of statistical significance. Notably, smaller market-to-
book also implies mature, fewer growth opportunities. Thus, the negative coefficient
on mtb holds for the empirical evidence that mature firms with fewer growth options
tend to hedge more aggressively, as in Mian (1996), Tufano (1996), Bartram, Brown,
and Fehle (2009), and among others.
Following Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), I run regression (IV) in
order to isolate within-firm variation in characteristics using firm-fixed effects regres-
sions. Comparing with model (I) and model (II), model (IV) shows that the firm-fixed
effects estimates are less significant for most measures, despite of the similarity of the
sign and magnitude of the coefficients. It thus suggests that some unobservable firm
characteristics might play a role in the significance of the coefficients but are not
responsible for the observed relations between firms profitability, information asym-
metry, growth potential, hedging cost, and hedge ratio.
3.5. Conclusions
This chapter delves deeper into the reasons for corporate hedging and documents the
important explanatory roles played by firm’s profitability, growth opportunity, and
informational asymmetry. I develop a theory of corporate optimal hedging policy in
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the presence of external financing frictions and asymmetric information on firm’s prof-
itability. The firm’s growth option offers future investment opportunity but creates
potential external financing needs. Due to information asymmetry between existing
shareholders and outside investors of the firm, issuing new equity imposes costs to
the firm. The issuance cost of equity financing is endogenously derived based on
outside investors’ inference process which is crucially influenced by the firm’s hedging
strategy. The firm’s optimal hedging policy, therefore, strategically balances the ben-
efits of less-frequent and less–costly external financing with better ability to finance
investment. I show that the attractiveness of hedging to a firm is determined by
both the value-enhancing and the transparency-enhancing potential of hedging. My
theoretical model provides the basis for my empirical analysis.
My empirical study then examines the key model predictions by using hand–
collected panel data on 62 the U.S. oil & gas firms’ derivative usage for hedging
commodity price risk. I find evidence in support of the theoretical model. First, I
find a positive relation between a firm’s profitability and hedging activity. Second,
a firm’s hedging incentive increases with the severity of informational asymmetry
but this relation becomes negative for extremely high–level informational asymme-
try. In addition, I find that informational asymmetry positively interacts with firms
profitability. Third, the relation between growth potential and hedging decision is
positive but modest in economical significance, and the marginal effect is negative,
implying that extremely large growth opportunity would reduce the firm’s hedging
incentive. Finally, consistent with the theory and intuition, I show that a firm with
less ability to access derivatives market is less likely to hedge by using an inverse
proxy of hedging cost.
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3.6. Appendix
3.6.1. Proof of Lemma
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Insiders and outsiders share the same prior belief for θ with












where Φ(·) is the cumulative probability of the standard normal distribution. Given
that equation 3.3 is publicly observable, the variation of w1 is entirely due to ϕ, the












Applying Bayes’ Theorem to draw an inference on θ gives
































which implies that the posterior distribution and the prior distribution share identical
parametic form. Hence, refer to Barr and Sherrill (1999) and Jawitz (2004), condi-
tional on the observed information w1 and h1, the posterior belief on θ is given as in
(3.4), which yields lim
h1↑1
E[θ|w1, h1] = lim
h1↑1
E[θ|x, h1] = θ.
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3.6.2. Numerical Methods
In the numerical solution of the two–period model, I use discretization to approximate
the continuous state variables, θ and ϕ. In particular, I let θ and ϕ take values from
intervals whose centers are µ and zero, respectively. For the range of θ, 11 points
are equally distributed. For the range of ϕ, 26 points are equally distributed. The
value functions are represented as functions on the grid points, and a piecewise linear
interpolation is used when function values on the non–grid points are needed.
The expectation is computed using the Gauss–Hermite quadrature method
with n = 11 sample points. In the quadrature method, the Gaussian integral is
















In the numerical solution of the model, the optimal hedge ratio is computed
through a two–period backward deduction using the optimization functions in Sec-
tion 3.2 for the complete information case and incomplete information case.
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3.6.3. Example Disclosures of Hedging
This appendix provides examples of commodity price hedging disclosures for the
U.S. oil and gas companies that use financial derivatives to hedge (see Panel A), use
financial derivatives to ineffectively hedge (see Panel B), and do not hedge (see Panel
C). The information is collected from the 10–K SEC filings of oil and natural gas
producers and illustrates how hedging activities varies by firm based on the firm’s
hedging mechanisms.
Panel A. Example disclosures from companies that effectively hedge future
commodity prices:
• From Consol Energy Inc. 2010’s report: “As of December 31, 2010, the total
notional amount of the Company’s outstanding natural gas swap contracts was
78.2 billion cubic feet. These swap contracts are forecasted to settle through
December 31, 2014 and meet the criteria for cash flow hedge accounting.”
• From Penn Virginia Corporation 2011’s report: “For 2012, we have hedged
approximately 47% of our estimated oil production at average floor/swap and
ceiling prices of $97.08 and $99.61 per barrel. In addition, we have hedged
approximately 32% of our estimated natural gas production at a weighted-
average floor/swap price of $5.43 per MMBtu and ceiling price of $6.05 per
MMBtu.”
• From Unit Corporation 2011’s report: “Our qualifying cash flow hedges used in
the ceiling test determination at December 31, 2011, consisted of swaps covering
5.0 MMBoe in 2012 and 0.7 MMBoe in 2013. The effect of those hedges on
the December 31, 2011 ceiling test was a $22.1 million pre-tax increase in the
discounted net cash flows of our oil and natural gas properties.”
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• From Unit Corporation 2016’s report: “For 2017, we have derivative contracts
covering approximately 3,750 Bbls per day of oil production. For the first quar-
ter, second and third quarters, we have hedged approximately 105,000 MMBtu
per day of natural gas production, and for the fourth quarter, we have hedged
approximately 92,000 MMBtu per day of natural gas production. For the first
quarter of 2018, we have hedged approximately 60,000 MMBtu per day of nat-
ural gas production. For the remainder of 2018, we have to date hedged ap-
proximately 20,000 MMBtu per day of natural gas production.”
Panel B. Example disclosures from companies that ineffectively hedge fu-
ture commodity prices:
• From Continental Resources, Inc. 2015’s report: “We do not designate any of
our derivative instruments as hedges for accounting purposes and we record all
derivatives on our balance sheet at fair value. Changes in the fair value of our
derivatives are recognized in current period earnings. Accordingly, our earnings
may fluctuate significantly as a result of changes in crude oil and natural gas
prices and resulting changes in the fair value of our derivatives. ...Our crude oil
sales for future periods are currently unhedged and directly exposed to continued
volatility in crude oil market prices, whether favorable or unfavorable.”
• From Exco Resources, Inc. 2012’s report: “We do not designate our derivative
financial instruments as hedges and accordingly, do not include the impact of
derivative financial instruments when computing the Standardized Measure.”
• From Goodrich Petroleum Corporation 2014’s report: “We offset the fair value
of our asset and liability positions with the same counterparty for each commod-
ity type. ...We have not designated any of our derivative contracts as hedges;
accordingly, changes in fair value are reflected in earnings.”
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• From Marathon Oil Corporation 2011’s report: “The fair value of commodity
derivatives outstanding at December 31, 2011 was less than $1 million. For these
derivatives, hypothetical 10 percent and 25 percent increases and decreases
in commodity prices would not significantly impact income from operations
(“IFO”).”
Panel C. Example disclosures from companies that do not hedge commod-
ity prices:
• From Barwell Industries, Inc, INC. 2017’s report: “In fiscal 2017, over 90% of
Barnwell’s oil and natural gas revenues were from products sold at spot prices.
Barnwell does not use derivative instruments to manage price risk.”
• From Contango Oil & Gas Company 2010’s report: “The Company did not enter
into any derivative instruments or hedging activities for the fiscal years ended
June 30, 2010, 2009 or 2008, nor did we have any open commodity derivative
contracts at June 30, 2010.”
• From Murphy Oil Corporation 2016’s report: “Except in limited cases, the
Company typically does not seek to hedge any significant portion of its exposure
to the effects of changing prices of crude oil, natural gas and refined products.”
• From Ring Energy, Inc. 2016’s report: “In order to reduce commodity price
uncertainty and increase cash flow predictability relating to the marketing of
our crude oil and natural gas, we may enter into crude oil and natural gas price
hedging arrangements with respect to a portion of our expected production. ...
As of December 31, 2015, we have not entered into any hedging arrangements
with respect to our expected production.”
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Chapter 4




Corporate use of financial derivatives increased exponentially over the last few decades.
Firms can use various types of derivatives to hedge the market risk exposures or to
speculate on the underlying assets. Current accounting standards require fair value
accounting for derivatives in a dedicated account. To some extent, these require-
ments meet the increasing public demand for information on firms’ use of derivative.
With separate accounts of hedging activity, the transparency of firm operations is
improved, and the knowledge of firm hedge transactions is enriched. However, fair
value-based accounting standards for derivatives can also induce managers to engage
in hedging strategies that are non–optimal for shareholders, if they could be poten-
tially beneficial from doing so. That is, if shareholders use derivative disclosure to
reveal information linked to managers’ benefit, it may lead to principal–agent conflict.
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Once the fair value of derivatives is observed from managers’ disclosure, the perfor-
mance of derivatives tends to be taken into account when outside investors assess
the financial skills and insights of managers. Such evaluation would only depend on
the payoff of derivatives rather than the aggregated performance of firm operation.
Firm executives compensation (managerial rent) can be then associated with gains
and losses from using derivatives. Managers are hence incentivized to take actions in
financial market to maximize their compensations rather than firm value.
Recent empirical researches find material effect of derivative gains on manage-
rial rent. For example, Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2010) use data from the
SEC, and examine the sensitivity of top executives compensation to securitization
gains. Their results show that managements are rewarded for the gains they report,
although gains on securitization are uncertain and not fully realized until future pe-
riods. It implies that firm managers are rewarded for gains on derivatives based on
fair values rather than realized payoff. The authors also suggest that the board of
directors of a firm treats derivative gains similar to operational earnings components.
Livne, Markarian, and Milne (2011) show that the phenomenon of rewarding man-
agers for derivative performance also exists in financial industry. However, neither
Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2010) or Livne, Markarian, and Milne (2011) in-
vestigate the effect of derivative loss on executives compensation. This question is
supplemented by Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016) who further show evi-
dence that executives cash compensation is significantly sensitive to gains from both
hedging and non-hedging derivatives by using a data sample from utility industry.
The authors also suggest an asymmetric bonus scheme for derivatives usage, which
implies a positive compensation for profitable derivatives but no penalty for any losses
on derivatives. Because the data samples in the above two papers are both collected
directly from the separate hedging accounts of corporations financial reports, their
findings suggest that the information from the hedging account is currently treated
as a measurement of top executives’ financial performance.
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In this chapter, I theoretically explore how managerial rent influences corpo-
rate hedging policy under current fair–value based accounting standards for deriva-
tives and how a compensation scheme for gains from derivatives impacts contracting
efficiency. The contracting efficiency is defined as the alignment of the interests of
manager and shareholders. I also discuss circumstances in which full disclosure could
affect severity of the agency issue in different ways. To do so, I propose managerial
rent into a dynamic, open-horizon model. In my model, a firm offers a long–term
contract to an infinitely lived manager whose wealth can be rarely diversified through
outside financial resources. The managerial compensation package comprises equity–
based rent and cash–based remuneration. The equity–based rent is in the form of a
certain level of access to the firm capital, whilst the cash compensation is an amount
of cash bonus rewarded for gains from corporate use of derivatives. The manager is
maximizing the present value of his compensation package. It is noteworthy that I
do not derive the form of an optimal incentive contract but instead approximate a
contract that actually exists in practice and that may or may not be optimal.
The rationale of such an assumption of managerial rent scheme is as follows.
Firstly, sharing power of public corporations with managers is quite normal nowadays
in order to align the interests of outside equity holders and inside managers. Evidently,
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control can be mitigated
by such a mechanism. For example, Tufano (1996) shows that managers tend to
substantially hedge firm value if managers own a substantial fraction of equity because
the volatility of their wealth is significantly related to the volatility of the equity price.
Therefore, it is reasonable in the model to give the manager the right to claim a
certain level of the firm’s cash flow as an equity holder. Secondly, empirical researches
provide an abundance of evidence of the reward mechanism for successful speculation.
For example, Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007) demonstrate that CFOs in those
frequently–speculating firms get a significantly greater amount of bonus than those
of CFOs of those firms that less frequently speculate. Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross,
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and Suk (2016) find that CEOs’ cash compensation is significantly sensitive to gains
from non–hedging derivatives. Hence, in the model of this chapter, the manager will
get an amount of cash bonus conditional on gains from financial derivatives, which is
also reasonable in practice.
The motivation of this work is from the association between reward scheme
for profitable derivatives and agency conflict. The aim of my research is mainly to
analyze the effect of the managerial compensation mechanism on hedging policy and
on any stakeholder’s interests. Previous researches using dynamic models mainly
focus on the rationale of managing risk and optimal hedging strategy,1 but a few of
them have analysed the managerial incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging
ratio for shareholders. Researches discussing agency problems, like DeMarzo and
Duffie (1995) compare different levels of transparency of information, but do not
well fit current compensation scheme used by most firms. The authors propose a
model with a perfect separation of ownership and control, in which manager acts
like a normal employee. In practice, however, top managers can usually act both as
an executive and a member of the board of directors, which means managerial rent
generally comprises both cash–based and equity–based compensations.
The basic idea of this chapter is related to DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) that
firm managers may take hedge positions for their own benefits which is possibly not
in line with shareholders stake. My model differs from their model especially in terms
of the type of contract and managerial compensation scheme. Firstly, in my model,
long–term contract is available, which is not in DeMarzo and Duffie’s paper. Such a
long–term incentive scheme mitigates the importance of reputational considerations
for managers. Secondly, I assume the manager holds a certain fraction of access to
corporate capital, which is not the case in those two authors’ model. This makes
my model more practical by allowing the manager to hold both equity–based and
1See Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011), Gamba and Triantis (2014), Rampini and Viswanathan
(2010), and Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), for example.
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cash–based compensation. Moreover, in my model the cash–based compensation to
the manager depends on the performance of financial derivatives solely instead of the
firm’s aggregated net income.
This chapter builds on the empirical evidence provided by empirical studies
that firms reward their managers for profitable derivatives, such as Dechow, My-
ers, and Shakespeare (2010), Livne, Markarian, and Milne (2011), and Manchiraju,
Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016). In their studies, the performance of derivatives is
directly observed from the separate account of hedging activity required by the cur-
rent fair–value based accounting standards. Some of my results are in line with the
conclusion of Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016) that reward for gains from
derivatives can reduce contracting efficiency. My research differs from their work
in respect to methodology and baseline model. More specifically, Manchiraju et al
focus on examining the sensitivity of managers’ compensation to derivative gains.
This chapter, however, uses a dynamic model to theoretically analyse the association
between managerial compensation and risk management policy.
This essay makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, my
research extends the work DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) by proposing a more practical
managerial incentive scheme. The career contract between the firm and manager
includes both equity–based and cash–based compensation, which makes the objective
of the firm manager differs from the objective of shareholders in respect of the choice of
hedging policy. This has not been previously analyzed. Second, my research provides
theoretical support for empirical works depicting managerial incentive for profitable
derivatives. I capture the conflict between firm manager and shareholders by using a
dynamic model that relieves the manager from the reputational considerations. Thus,
my results are believed to be persistent. Third, I explore the association between the
cash compensation for fair value based-accounting earnings and contracting efficiency
in different situations respectively. To my best knowledge, my research is the first
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that shows that the degree of the conflict varies among different situations.
The structure of this chapter is as follow. Section 4.2 reviews the prevailing
literature that is related to this study. Section 4.3 proposes the theoretical model
settings and assumptions. In Section 4.4, the numerical results will be shown, and
the conflict between firm managers and outside shareholders will be analyzed. Finally,
conclusions and some implications will be summarized in Section 4.5.
4.2. Prior literature
Theoretical researches suggest various managerial incentives for firm managers to use
financial derivatives as a hedging tool under fair value based accounting concepts.
First is to mitigate the contracting costs caused by agency conflicts.2 Mayers and
Smith Jr (1982) and Mayers and Smith Jr (1987) indicate that thereof contracting
costs provides the basis for the demand for insurance of corporations. Managers tend
to use financial hedging tools in order to avoid financing restriction. Stulz (1984)
further shows that risk–averse managers are more willing to hedge firm value.
Second is to reduce external costs facing firms, and thus, to potentially increase
the present value of future cash flows. For example, Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest
that firms will generally be beneficial from hedge if taxation is a convex function of
earnings. Moreover, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) analyze the circumstance in
which external resources are more costly than internal funds, and suggest a typical
benefit to hedging because it helps firms keep sufficient internal funds when attractive
investment opportunities occur. In this way, hedge can reflect the willingness of
managers to reduce cash flow volatility, and thus reflects the alignment of the interests
of managers and shareholders.
2Agency problems in public corporations are mainly created by the separation between ownership
and control. See seminal works by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980)
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Empirical researches also find results supportive of the fact that fair value
based hedge is desirable. For instance, Mian (1996) finds financial derivatives lowers
contracting costs and risk associated with equity return. Adam and Fernando (2006)
use data from gold mining industry and indirectly demonstrate that firms’ derivatives
transactions translate into increase in shareholder value. More recently, Bartram,
Brown, and Conrad (2011) use data from non–financial firms to examine the effect
of derivative use on firms’ risk and market values and show a strong and consistent
evidence of lower cash flow risk, equity price risk, and systematic risk. Pérez-González
and Yun (2013) demonstrate that active risk management leads to a statistically
significant increase in firm value by using utility firms as a data sample.
However, researches list above have a basic postulate that interests of man-
agers and shareholders are well aligned. In other words, the firm-wide governance
mechanisms are assumed to be perfectly effective. Managers use financial derivatives
to hedge firm value just for the purpose of maximizing firm values. In practice, never-
theless, this is not always the truth. Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007) demonstrate
that frequent speculation of firms is associated with weak firm-wide governance mech-
anisms. Bartram (2017) finds evidence consistent with that firms use derivatives for
both hedging purpose and speculative component.
In fact, on the one hand, researches show that hedge under fair value based
accounting provides managers with opportunities for reducing cash flow volatility, and
hence reduces contracting costs. On the other hand, reward scheme for gains from
derivatives based on fair value accounting gives managers incentives that are not
mainly to bring extra benefits for shareholders but for managers’ personal interests.
For example, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) propose a model that managers undertake
hedging positions and achieve greater risk reduction in order to show their own ability
to labour market. Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) also argue that managers are
incentivized to hedge firm value to increase their ability to signal their managerial
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quality. Furthermore, Tufano (1996) empirically shows that new financial managers
would have less developed reputation and thus seek to signal their management quality
through hedging.
As for the difference in value–adding effect between derivatives designated as
hedge and non–hedge, Gamba and Triantis (2014) show that derivatives with effec-
tively large correlation always create greater firm value than derivatives with ineffec-
tive correlation do. Consistently, Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) find evidence
that potential economic benefit created by firm selective hedging is negligible. Géczy,
Minton, and Schrand (2007) find that firm size of speculators is insignificantly larger
than the size of those firms that never speculate. Hence, in a way, it is believed
that hedge–designated derivatives increase firm value, while speculation–designated
derivatives can rarely do that.3
4.3. Model setup
The model in this chapter continues a line of Gamba and Triantis (2014). I consider an
unlevered firm (the firm) in absence of taxation with the separation of ownership and
control in my model. I use a discrete–time, infinite–horizon framework to model the
operating process, hedging decisions, and payout policy of a firm. Any cash flows of
the firm are obtained at the end of each period when the state is observed. I assume
that shareholders hire an expert to manage the firm, since she has better skills in
production and financial knowledge. The firm’s manager (the manager) holds a fixed
fraction, 0 < α < 1, of claim on the firm’s cash flow. In practice, a firm may be able
to design in a higher α in order to strengthen the manager’s incentives or a lower α
to increase access to capital. Please note that I do not derive any form of an optimal
3Appendix 3.6.3 provides example disclosures from 10–K SEC filings of oil and natural gas com-
panies that effectively and ineffectively hedge risks via financial derivatives. The disclosures meet
the requirements of the fair–value hedge accounting criteria.
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career contract, but instead, approximate a contract that practitioners use and that
may or may not be optimal. Hence, I do not consider any information asymmetry
and signaling problems in my model.
4.3.1. Production technology
The market price of one unit of the firm’s products is regarded as stochastic, denoted
by θ1. Assuming risk neutrality in this model, the log of this price variable, x1 = log θ1,
has the following process:
x1,t − x1,t−1 = (1− κ1)(µ1 − x1,t−1) + σ1ε1,t, (4.1)
where 0 ≤ κ1 ≤ 1 is the persistence parameter; µ1 = log θ̄1 denotes the long–term
mean of the log price; σ1 > 0 is the conditional standard deviation; and ε1 denotes the
shocks to the log price of products, which are independent and identically distributed
standard normal variates. We can think of the risk ε1 as corresponding to fluctuations
in commodity prices, or social demands; and σ1 is the level of exposure of the firm to
ε1.
Suppose the firm produces one unit of products from its operation in each
period for sure. The net cash income from operations in the current period, denoted
as gt(θ1) = gt,
4 is thus equal to the revenue θ1 less the fixed production cost, f > 0.
That is,
gt = θ1,t − f. (4.2)
Hence, the entire business risk facing the firm’s operational income is the fluc-
tuation in its product price. The firm is able to hedge this risk exposure to some
4The notation gt(·) indicates that the value of g at the time t depends on the information (·)
available at time t. This will be consistent in all my notations hereafter.
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extent by using financial instruments. In addition, the fixed production cost, f , can
be regarded as a measure of financial constraints. A higher level of fixed cost rate
represents a situation in which the firm is more financially constrained. It is implicitly
assumed that a firm could be financially constrained due to various reasons including
limitation of productivity, debt outstanding, labour wages, etc. The impact of dif-
ferent levels of financial constraints on the alignment of the interests of the manager
and shareholders will be discussed in detail in Section 4.4.2.
4.3.2. Hedging
In financial market, a derivative contract is available to hedge the firm’s business risk
to some extent. The hedging decision of the firm is made by the manager. The firm
can take a certain position in a swap agreement issued by a bank. The underlying
asset of the contract has the market price, θ2, and its log price, x2 = log θ2, follows
the stochastic process
x2,t − x2,t−1 = (1− κ2)(µ2 − x2,t−1) + σ2ε2,t, (4.3)
where 0 ≤ κ2 ≤ 1, µ2 = log θ̄2, σ2 > 0, and ε2 denotes the independent and identi-
cally distributed standard normal variables, in line with the notations of x1. Here θ2
is regarded as corresponding to, for example, a market index; and thus ε2 is corre-
sponding to the fluctuation of price in this index. I denote Θ = (θ1, θ2)
′ as the vector
of the exogenous state variables. Thus, each firm in the economy has a certain corre-
lation between its business risk and the fluctuation in this underlying asset price, i.e.
Et[ε1,tε2,t] = ρ, almost surely.5 This correlation coefficient determines the direction
of hedging position. If ρ > 0, the firm will only take a long position in the swap
contract; whereas if ρ < 0, the firm will only take a short position. It is convenient
5Note for any t 6= t′, Et[ε1,tε2,t′ ] = 0.
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and without loss of generality to only consider the case in which ρ > 0 in my model.
Generally, a perfect hedging tool without basis risk (i.e. ρ = 1) can rarely be found
in practice. Hence, I restrict my analysis to the case in which 0 < ρ < 1 in order to
capture basis risk.
If the firm takes a long position in a swap contract for a notional capital of one
dollar, then at the end of period t, the firm will be required to deliver θ2,t in exchange
to receive s, where s = θ̄2 is a given constant. That is, with a notional physical
amount ht ∈ [0, 1], the total payoff from the contract at the end of each subsequent
date t is ht(s − θ2,t). Therefore, the par value of the swap for each unit of notional





(1 + rf )i
<∞, (4.4)
where Fi(θ2, t) = Et[θ2, t + i] denotes the price at any time t of delivery the asset at
time t + i; Et[·] is the expectation under the risk-neutral probability, conditional on
the information at time t, and rf is the risk–free rate. The forward price is calculated
as follows:












At time t + 1, the firm can default on the swap and choose to change the
notional amount, for ht+1 6= ht, where ht+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Then the firm needs to redeem
the current contract at the par value and enter into a new position at fair values. In
the absence of arbitrage opportunity, the fair value of the swap contract, SFt, must
involve both counterparty risk and the option to close the position in the future. For
simplicity, I assume that the bank selling the swap is not subject to default risk, and
thus the only credit charge is related to the default possibility of the firm. Hence, the
102
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+ χ{Td<Tp}
RSt(Θ, t+ Td)
(1 + rf )Td
]
, (4.5)
where Td denotes the default date of the firm, and Tp denotes the date the swap
position is closed, both stopping times with respect to the process Θt. The term
χ{Td≥Tp} is the indicator function of the event that default happens after the position
is closed, and χ{Td<Tp} denotes the case in which the opposite happens. The bank’s
recovery value on the swap upon defaults, RSt(·), depends on the value of the firm
at its bankruptcy.
In sum, cash flow rises from any hedging strategy is the sum of the net payoff
from the contract and changes in fair value of hedging strategy. Because the cash flow
from any derivative transactions is recognized at the end of each period, the realized
net cash flow from hedging contract, wt(θ2, ht, ht+1, SPt, SFt) = wt, at time t can be
written as
wt = ht(s− θ2,t) + χ{ht+1 6=ht}(htSPt − ht+1SFt), (4.6)
where χ{ht+1 6=ht} is the indicator function of event ht+1 6= ht.
4.3.3. Cash compensation contract
Under current fair value based accounting standard for hedge, the firm is required to
report the net realized payoff and any changes in fair value of the hedging contract
to shareholders at the end of each period. Hence, under the accrual accounting
concept, the information set disclosed to outside investors at time t is denoted as
I = {ht(s − θ2,t), htSFt, ht−1SFt−1}. Then the observed fair–value gain or loss from
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the swap contract, yt(θ2, ht−1, ht, SFt−1, SFt) = yt, is calculated as
yt = ht(s− θ2,t) + htSFt − ht−1SFt−1. (4.7)
Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016) show that gains from derivatives
(regardless of the hedge designation) are significantly positively related to managers’
cash compensation. One explanation is that shareholders treat the performance of
derivatives as a signal of the managers’ financial skills. Based on this result, it is
supposed in my model that the manager will get an amount of cash compensation
(or bonus) for the fair–value gains from the hedging contract. This bonus is in the
form of an amount of cash conditional on the derivative realized payoff and change in
fair value. However, Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk also show that managerial
cash compensation is much more sensitive to derivative gains than to derivative losses.
Thus, in my model, the manager only get cash bonus from derivative gains but does
not incur penalty for derivative loss.
In the base case version of my model, I consider a fixed amount of cash com-
pensation to start with, which is also analogous to the setup in DeMarzo and Duffie
(1995). In Section 4.4.4, I will discuss the case in which the cash bonus is linear and
concave with respect to the magnitude of derivative gains, respectively. Here, the
cash bonus, zt(yt) = zt, to the manager for profitable derivatives can be written as
zt = ζytχ{yt>0} (4.8)
where ζ denotes a constant fraction of cash bonus accounting for the derivatives’
fair–value gain, and χ{yt>0} is the indicator function of positive profits from derivative
tradings at time t. This bonus is classified as one term of employee wages so that
it takes priority over any dividends payout and flotation payments. This cash–based
compensation scheme can be also regarded as a typical incentive plan consists of zero
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payment if performance is below a specified threshold, which is consistent with the
survey of executive compensation in Murphy (1999). In other words, in my model,
the manager only get cash bonus from successful speculation but does not incur
penalty from loss on speculation. Recent empirical studies, such as Manchiraju,
Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016), show supportive evidence that top-executive cash
compensation is 70% more sensitive to non–hedge derivative gains than it is to non–
hedge derivative losses, which is consistent to my model setup.
4.3.4. Payout policy
The net cash flow to the firm, denoted as πt(gt, wt, zt) = πt, in the current period is
the sum of net cash flows from operation and hedging contract netting of any cash
bonus paid to the manager:
πt = gt + wt − zt. (4.9)
In this model, πt can be either positive or negative as a consequence of the
profitability and the payoff of hedging contract. Assume the firm has no cash balance,
then in the absence of leverage and taxation, shareholders (including the manager
who holds α of the firm’s equity) receive the net cash inflow at the end of period t,
if πt > 0. The firm will be in a liquidity crisis if the total net cash flow to the firm is
negative, i.e. πt < 0. In this case, the firm will raise further equity capital to ensure
the operation going forward. In addition to the cash raised for covering the shortfall,
shareholders will incur a flotation cost, λ per dollar, of external fund in this case of
distress. Therefore, if the net cash flow is negative, shareholders will pay an amount
of (1 + λ)πt in total. In sum, the net cash flow to equity at the end of period t,
denoted as et(πt) = et, is the net cash flow from operation and hedging contract less
any managerial monetary compensation:
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et = max{πt, 0}+ min{πt, 0}(1 + λ). (4.10)
Moreover, it is assumed that the manager will always pay her own cash to purchase
an equal fraction of the new issued shares in order to avoid a dilution of her power
when the firm raises external fund by issuing equity. This would pose an interest
conflict between the manager and shareholders because shareholders would actually
afford the manager’s risky action. For instance, if gt+wt = 0 but yt > 0, the manager
will get a bonus of zt, resulting in πt = −zt. However, the manager just needs to pay
α(1 +λ)zt to prevent the dilution, and shareholders must pay (1−α)(1 +λ)zt, which
is actually compensating the manager.
Shareholders have the objective of maximizing the present value of cash flow to
equity by choosing an optimal hedging magnitude for next period. If the equity value
is negative, shareholders will simply close the firm and leave because of the limited
liability. Therefore, the equity value, denoted by Et(et, ht+1) = Et, is
Et = max
{
maxht+1∈H{et + βEΘ[Et+1]}, 0
}
, (4.11)
where EΘ[·] denotes the expectation conditional on the observed current state, Θt;
and H denotes the set of all feasible choices of the notional amount of hedging for
next period. The outcome of states in next period, Θt+1, is unknown until the end of
period t+ 1. The discount factor for valuing the equity of the firm is β = 1/(1 + rf ),
where rf is the risk–free interest rate in the market. The hedging policy solved from
equation (4.11) is regarded as the first–best. Hereafter, the first–best hedging policy
will be denoted by hE for convenience.6 Note outside shareholders are not able to
directly observe or derive hE unless they can perfectly learn the magnitude of σ1.
6The first–best hedging policy, hE , can be explained as a hedging policy chosen by an imaginary




In line with the previous description, the value of managerial rent is the present value
of a combination of the equity–based and the cash–based compensations. As I have
already wiped out the reputational concerns by allowing a long–term career contract,
the manager would have the objective of managerial value maximization. Hence, the
manager tends to choose a hedging magnitude that maximizes the managerial rent.
However, as shareholders hold property rights to the assets of the firm, managerial
rent will become zero once the operation is shut down by shareholders (i.e. when
Et = 0). Hence, the managerial rent, Rt(et, zt, ht+1) = Rt, can be written as
Rt =

maxht+1∈H{αet + zt + βEΘ[Rt+1]}, if Et(et, hR) > 0,
0, if Et(et, h
R) = 0,
(4.12)
where β is assumed to be equal to the discount factor for valuing the equity. The
term Et(et, h
R) is found as the fixed point of a Bellman equation similar to (4.11), in
which the optimization with respect to hE is excluded, because we apply the man-
ager’s optimal response, hR, to the entire firm and get Et(et, h
R) = max{et(hR) +
βEΘ[Et+1(et+1, hR)], 0}. Hence, the equity value is not the one calculated by using
the first–best policy for shareholders but the optimal response of the manager. It is
expected that the equity value is reduced due to the deviation from equity maximiza-
tion. Because shareholders hold the property right of the firm, they are always able
to close the firm when the value of their equity goes below to zero due to applying
the hedging policy hR.
The owner–manager case (α = 1) coincides with a special case of the more
general case of separation between ownership and control. Setting α = 1 not only
perfectly aligns the interests of the manager and shareholders, but it also reduces the
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cash–based compensation to zero. The proof of the case in which Et(h
R) = 0 can be
easily seen as Rt = 0. The proof of the case in which Et(h
R) > 0 is as follows:
Rt = maxht+1∈H{αet + zt + βEΘ[Rt+1]}
= maxht+1∈H{(gt + wt − zt) + zt + βEΘ[Rt+1]}
= maxht+1∈H{gt + wt + βEΘ[Rt+1]},
whose solution hR is equal to the first–best hedging ratio hE. This makes this special
case equivalent to the owner-manager case, in which any agency problem is ruled out.
The expression of Rt in equation (4.12) demonstrates the incentive scheme in
my model, comprising two parts. First, αEt presents a natural alignment of the inter-
ests of the manager and shareholders. By giving the manager the ability to capture
cash flow, her wealth is directly related to the aggregated performance of the firm.
Second, zt presents an encouragement of keeping a positive value in financial deriva-
tives. This cash–based compensation fits the empirical evidence that shareholders are
rewarding managers who have high financial ability and insight.
Meanwhile, equation (4.12) also shows that the manager distorts the first-
best hedging decision. A difference between hR and hE implies an agency conflict
between the manager and shareholders in respect of the choice of hedging policies,
and thus causes a reduction of contracting efficiency, which is the fundamental tension
in this research. Essentially, the conflict is caused by the cash bonus for profitable
derivatives, as a consequence of treating the derivative performance as a measure of
the manager’s financial skill. The cash–based reward induces the manager to increase
the expected fair value of derivatives by deviating from the first–best hedging ratio.
Therefore, I make te following prediction: With a compensation scheme for profitable




In this section, I will explore and discuss the impact of the incentive scheme on
the contracting efficiency. The degree of efficiency is determined by comparing the
actual equity value with the first–best equity value, that is, Et(et;h
R)/Et(et;h
E). The
agency conflict is observed if there exists a difference between the equity value with
hR adopted by the manager and the equity value with the first–best hedging ratio hE.
The numerical technique is an iterative method for solving a Bellman equation with
a bivariate-normal specification for the state transitions, following Tauchen (1986)
and Terry and Knotek II (2011). Details of the numerical procedure are provided in
Appendix 4.6.1. In this chapter, I present a calibrated model to obtain results that
help to explain existing evidence, and to provide further implications.
4.4.1. The misalignment of interests
The baseline parameters for the firm’s production and the underlying asset of hedging
contract are shown in Table 4.1. The rationale for the parameter choices of business
risk and hedgeable risk is in line with Gamba and Triantis (2014), corresponding to
some typical values found in existing literature.7 It is noteworthy that the correlation
coefficient, ρ, measures the ability of the firm to hedge its business risk exposure using
financial derivatives. The risk exposure to θ1 is considered as the main motivation
for hedging. However, in practice, firms always face many kinds of risk that cannot
be fully hedged by a single derivative contract. For example, Bartram, Brown, and
Minton (2010) find that, despite financial hedging can significantly reduce foreign
exchange exposure for a global sample of manufacturing firms, these firms would still
face many other risks that are not as readily hedgeable. Consistently, Guay and
7See Gamba and Triantis (2014) for details.
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Kothari (2003) suggest that corporate derivative use has very modest effect. The
lack of derivative instruments that closely track entire risk exposure is considered as
one key reason why the ability of hedge to reduce firm’s cash-flow volatility is not
economically significant. Here I use a general formulation in my model rather than
breaking down various types of risk that can or cannot be hedged, and thus, the
correlation between the derivative contract and the hedged item is believed to be
quite low.
µ1 long–term mean of product log price variable 0
µ2 long–term mean of underlying asset log price variable 0
σ1 Annual volatility of x1 15%
σ2 Annual volatility of x2 15%
κ1 Persistence of x1 0.8
κ2 Persistence of x2 0.8
ρ Correlation Between product price and swap 0.1
f Fixed production cost 0.97
s Swap price (fixed rate) 1.0
rf Annual risk-free interest rate 5%
λ Flotation cost rate for equity issuance 5%
Table 4.1: Baseline Parameter Values
My analysis starts with a firm whose equity shares are partly held by its man-
ager. The fraction of equity held by the manager, α, represents the level of managerial
ownership. Empirical estimations on managerial ownership in real world show that
firm managers on average own small fractions of the firm equity. For example, Jensen
and Murphy (1990) find managerial compensation has a very weak relation with firm
equity value. More recently, in Nikolov and Whited (2014), the estimated result
demonstrates that the lower quartile, the median and the top quartile of the fraction
of equity shares excluding options are 0.3%, 0.8% and 2.8%, respectively. Therefore,
in my estimation, the parameter α ranges from 0.3% to 2.8%. In addition, I consider
three other parameters to present my analysis: the cash bonus, ζ, the persistence of
prices processes, κ = (κ1, κ2)
′, and the volatility of prices, σ = (σ1, σ2)
′. The amount
of cash bonus is set to be reasonably low. The persistence and the volatility of prices
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processes take values in a range whose center is roughly the estimate from Table 4.1.
Figure 4.1 exhibits an outline of the conflict between the manager and share-
holders in respect of hedging policies, when the cash–based bonus scheme, zt, for
profitable derivatives is involved. Each panel corresponds to a different variable that
may affect hedging decision, in which the sensitivity of contracting efficiency on the
vertical axis to a particular parameter on the horizontal axis. The higher the degree
of efficiency, the weaker the agency conflict in respect of hedging decisions. That is,
a higher degree of efficiency reflects a circumstance in which the manager choose a
hedging policy that deviates far from the first-best one. In all cases, cash flow natu-
rally rises in the state θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 1, which are exactly the long–term mean of
their processes.
My first result is that contracting efficiency increases with managerial owner-
ship, and decreases with the amount of compensation for profitable derivatives. This
result matches our common sense. Intuitively, the larger the fraction of managerial
ownership or the smaller the encouragement on profitable derivatives, the more in-
centive of maximizing firm equity value the manager will have. Hence, based on this
numerical result, I can make the following prediction: Once investors interpret the fair
values of financial derivatives as a signal of executives’ financial insight and skill, firm
managers will improperly use financial derivatives to hedge firm production for their
own stake, which actually damages shareholders’ benefit and contracting efficiency.
Next, I examine the parameters that govern market states. The bottom two
panels illustrate how contracting efficiency is affected by persistence and volatility
of processes of product price and the underlying asset’s price. I find that the man-
ager’s behavior, in terms of choosing hedging ratios, depends critically on these two
parameters. Firstly, a monotonic and positive relation between the persistence, κ,
and contracting efficiency is observed. As κ rises, it is more likely that a profitable
production (high θ1) will continue to be profitable, and vice versa. As a result, with
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a large κ, equity–based compensation will have a dominating influence on managerial
compensation package. The manager then will concern more about their equity–based
compensation, and adopt some hedging ratios close to the first–best one. Secondly,
the effect of process volatility, σ, on contracting efficiency is also monotonic but
negative. An increase in σ implies a larger possibility that the hedging contract is
profitable. Therefore, in contrast to the effect of κ, a larger σ yields a higher likeli-
hood for getting cash bonus. In turn, the manager will adopt a hedging ratio that
deviates farther from the first–best policy, because she is more likely to gain cash
bonus by doing so.
Figure 4.1: The Conflict between Manager and Shareholders
Notes: The figure depicts how contracting efficiency is affected by the managerial
ownership (α), the magnitude of cash compensation for profitable derivatives (ζ),
the persistence at lag one of the prices processes (κ), and the volatility of the prices
processes (σ). Note it is assumed that κ1 = κ2 and σ1 = σ2, so any specific values
κs and σs taken by κ and σ in the graph implies (κ1, κ2)
′ = (κs, κs)
′ and (σ1, σ2)
′ =
(σs, σs)
′. For example, κ = 0.8 and σ = 0.15 in the graph means (κ1, κ2)
′ = (0.8, 0.8)′
and (σ1, σ2)
′ = (0.15, 0.15)′. The contracting efficiency is measured by comparing
equity value Et(et;h
R) relative to its first-best level. The baseline parameters used
to generate the figure are in line with Table 4.1.
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4.4.2. Effect of financial constraint
Observations could be different as a consequence of changing the level of financial
constraint when the firm raises external funds. In this model, the financial constraint
of the firm is measured by the flotation cost, λ. With the same market price, a
more financially constrained firm has lower ability for tapping external capital than
a less constrained firm does, which means a more financially constrained firm is more
likely to be in distress. In the base case, the flotation cost is set as λ = 5%. In the
estimation of this section, I will compare how different levels of financial constraint
affect the alignment of the interests of the manager and shareholders.
Figure 4.2: Effect of Financial Constraint
Notes: This figure is to compare the degree of contracting efficiency among various
levels of financial constraints (λ) facing the firm. The left panel plots the efficiency in
response to the product price (θ1), and the right panel plots the efficiency in response
to the underlying asset price of the hedging contract (θ2). In the base case, λ = 5%;
in the low–cost case, λ = 2%; and in the high–cost case, λ = 8%. The baseline
parameters used to generate the figure are in line with Table 4.1.
Figure 4.2 contains two panels to show the alignment of the interest of the man-
ager and shareholders, when the firm faces different levels of financial constraint (i.e.
high–constraint, base, and low–constraint case). Roughly the contracting efficiency
shows a “V–shaped” relation with both the change in product price and the change
in underlying asset price in all three cases. This result suggests that the agency con-
flict in hedging decision is considerably apparent when the market states are around
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its long–term mean, 1.0, and is alleviated when the market states are much below–
or above–average. The degree of contracting efficiency approaches 100% when the
firm faces either a market collapse (< 0.5) or a great booming market (> 1.5). The
intuition behind the V–shape of curves revolves around the importance of managerial
ownership to the compensation package. With extreme market conditions, the value
of managerial ownership affects the manager’s compensation package more than cash
compensation for derivatives performance does. In particular, when a market collapse
occurs, the manager will be aware that her total compensation is at risk due to a bad
performance of equity value; whereas, when the market is booming, the manager will
find that she could earn more from equity share than from speculation in financial
derivatives. It is thus understandable that the manager is more motivated to optimize
firm equity value in extreme market states than in normal market states.
The degree of contracting efficiency of the three cases differ in several ways.
The firm with higher financial constraint has a higher degree of contracting efficiency
on average, which is directly reflected by the position of each curve. It implies that
a higher level of financial constraint lessens the conflict between the manager and
shareholders. One possible explanation on this observation could be that if a firm
faces a higher financial constraint, the manager’s compensation will be dominantly
affected by the risk of distress, so that the manager will concern more about equity
value. In turn, the interests of outside shareholders and the manager are better
aligned in a higher constrained firm. Moreover, the shapes of curves slightly vary
among different cases. The curve of a lower constrained firm is more skewed from the
long–term mean of prices of firm product and underlying asset. The minimum point
of each curve denotes the situation in which the manager has the biggest hope for a
cash reward. The manager in the high–constrained firm has the worst behavior in
choosing hedging policy when θ1 and θ2 takes the value of 1.0, whereas the manager
in the low–constrained firm has the lowest contracting efficiency when θ1 is slightly
above 1.0 or θ2 is below 0.8.
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4.4.3. Effect of hedging ability
In my model, the hedging ability of the firm is gouged by the correlation between
the hedging contract and the product price as described previously. With different
levels of hedging ability, firms could achieve different values. Pérez-González and
Yun (2013) find that a launch of new financial instrument enables firms to obtain a
better ability to eliminate risk exposure, and thus firms are expected to increase in
value. However, a higher hedging ability also implies a smaller possibility of profitable
derivatives, which directly influences the manager’s expectation on the cash–based
compensation. Consequently, the manager’s decision in hedging strategies may differ
when the hedging ability of the firm varies. Thus, in this section, I will explore
the effect of hedging ability on the alignment of the interests of the manager and
shareholders.
Panels in Figure 4.3 are organized to show the effect of financial hedging ability
on the alignment of managerial interest and shareholders’ stake. In each graph, curves
respectively correspond to various levels of hedging ability ρ of 0.1 (the base case), 0.5
(medium level), and 0.9 (high level). Similar to the base–case curves, both medium-ρ
and high–ρ curves in Figure 4.3 present a “V–shape”. This result indicates that the
lowest contracting efficiency occurs around θ1 = 1.0 and θ2 = 1.0, while the agency
conflict is alleviated when θ1 and θ2 are extremely low or extremely high.
Looking among three curves in each graph, the effect of hedging ability on
contracting efficiency is surely considerable. Surprisingly, the firm with a higher
hedging ability has a lower contracting efficiency than the firm with a lower hedging
ability does. Roughly, the dotted curves (representing the high–ability firm) is below
the dash curve (representing the medium-ability firm), and the dash curve is below the
solid curve. In addition, curves representing a higher-ability firm are less skewed from
1.0. One intuition for this result is that higher hedging ability lowers the possibility
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of cash reward for profitable derivatives, which makes the manager focus more on the
cash compensation than on the equity value, especially when the prices of product and
underlying asset are around long–term mean. However, a more accurate economic
explanation might be needed to supplement this numerical result.
Figure 4.3: Effect of Hedging Ability
Notes: This figure is to compare the degree of contracting efficiency among various
levels of hedging ability (ρ) of the firm. The left panel plots the efficiency in response
to the product price (θ1), and the right panel plots the efficiency in response to
the underlying asset price of the hedging contract (θ2). In the base case, ρ = 0.1,
represented by the solid curves; in the medium-ability case, ρ = 0.5, represented
by the dash curves; and in the high-ability case, ρ = 0.9, represented by the dotted
curves. The baseline parameters used to generate the figure are in line with Table 4.1.
4.4.4. Effect of cash compensation
The frame of cash compensation can also be an important concern when the manager
makes financial decisions. As described previously, shareholders treat the performance
of derivatives as a signal of the manager’s financial skill and insight, so that the
cash compensation for profitable derivatives is involved in managerial compensation
package. Murphy (1999) documents that compensation packages typically consist
of a fixed wage, a profit share, straight equity and options. In this research, I do
not take any exercizable or non–exercizable options into consideration because of its
complexity. The equity–based compensation is referred to as the straight equity part
in the compensation package. In addition, equation (4.8) is an example in which
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shareholders encourage positive fair values of derivatives by setting a fixed amount of
cash bonus for profitable derivatives, which can be regarded as a fixed wage included
in compensation package. However, shareholders are also likely to design in a reward
scheme in which the amount of bonus is positively related to the amount of derivative
gains, which can be regarded as a profit share. It then raises a question: Will such a
scheme improve the alignment of the interests?
In order to explore the effect of different cash compensation schemes, I propose
an alternative cash compensation scheme in which the amount of reward is directly
related to the payoff of profitable derivatives. The scheme, zAt = z





where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is a constant. One advantage of this type of scheme is its smooth
decline in cash bonus instead of a sudden deduction before the fair value of derivative
decreases to zero. When γ = 1, the scheme is linear to positive payoff of derivatives,
and the amount of cash bonus is directly proportional to gains from derivatives.
That is exactly the base–case compensation scheme in (4.8). With an open interval
(0 < γ < 1), it can be seen that the cash bonus is a non–linear function against the
payoff of derivatives, when the hedging contract is profitable. A non–linear scheme
is encouraging the manager to keep a positive fair value of derivative instrument in
the account, but the reward grows slower when the magnitude of profitable derivative
goes high.
Figure 4.4 is constructed to show the effect of the concavity of cash compen-
sation on the alignment of the interest of the manager and shareholders. There are
three examples with different concavity coefficients in each panel. Other than the
base–case curves (γ = 1), the dotted curves represent a linear bonus scheme for prof-
itable derivatives with γ = 0.5, and the solid curves represent a concave bonus scheme
with γ = 0.01. In order to keep equity value consistent, for the γ = 0.5 scheme, the
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coefficient of cash reward, ζ, is assumed to be 5 times of the baseline parameter;
and for the γ = 0.01 scheme, ζ is set to be 3 times of the baseline parameter. The
V–shaped relation holds for the curves representing the two alternative schemes. The
agency conflict in choosing hedging policy is most apparent when θ1 is around 1.1
or when θ2 is around 0.8, and is alleviated when θ1 and θ2 come out other values,
according to the graphs in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Effect of Concavity of Cash Compensation
Notes: This figure is to compare the degree of contracting efficiency among various
concavity coefficient (γ) of the firm cash compensation scheme. The left panel plots
the efficiency in response to the product price (θ1), and the right panel plots the
efficiency in response to the underlying asset price of the hedging contract (θ2). In
the base case, γ = 1, the cash scheme is a linear–compensation scheme, represented
by the dashed curves; in the first non–linear case, γ = 0.5, represented by the dotted
curves; and in the second non–linear case, γ = 0.01, represented by the solid curves.
The baseline parameters used to generate the figure are in line with Table 4.1.
Overall, Figure 4.4 shows that, comparing to the linear–compensation scheme,
the non–linear schemes increase contracting efficiency. However, the linear scheme
aggravates the agency conflict when θ1 > 1.0. This result is reflected by the curves
position in each panel. In the left panel of Figure 4.4, the dotted curve locates above
the solid curve, but the dash curve roughly locates below the solid curve in the range
θ1 > 1.0. Rather, in the right panel of Figure 4.4, the dash curve and the dotted
curve both locate above the solid curve. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the non–
linear scheme always results in a higher degree of contracting efficiency than the linear
scheme does.
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My results in this section suggest two implications. First, ceteris paribus, by
relating the amount of cash bonus to the amount of profitable derivatives, the interests
of the manager and shareholders is overall better aligned. Second, the misalignment
of interest is aggravated by the linear scheme when θ1 > 1.0, as a consequence of
higher expectation of a lucky draw in financial market.
4.4.5. Simulations
A structural estimation of my model is limited because of the lack of detailed empirical
data on the magnitude of hedging and the amount of executives cash compensation,
and would lead to unreliable parameter estimates. Instead, I present a simulation to
explain my main results, and to provide empirical implications.
I use Monte Carlo simulation to generate a sample of possible future paths
for the state variables. The simulated dynamics of the state variables θ1 and θ2 are
obtained by applying the recursive formula (4.1) and (4.3) for t = 0, 1, ..., T−1, where
ε1 and ε2 are independent draws from Normal distributions N(0, σ1) and N(0, σ2),
respectively. There are Ω1 possible future paths for θ1 and Ω2 for θ2, each refers to
as an economy for the product price and for the underlying asset price, respectively.
The optimal policy function for shareholders is from the solution of valuation problem
in equation (4.11), while the optimal function for the manager is from the solution
of equation (4.12). In my numerical experiments, I generate simulated state samples
with Ω1 = 17 economies and Ω2 = 17 economies. The firm sample involves 10,000
firms for each combination of economic states, and T = 150 years (steps) for each
firm.
Table 4.2 summarizes the information of statistics of the sample simulated.
Numbers outside bracket are the mean value of each data, while numbers inside
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Et Rt h
E hR ∆h t-test
Base case 1.298 0.013 0.328 0.401 0.073 > 99
(0.773) (0.006) (0.164) (0.095) — —
f = 0.95 1.605 0.033 0.522 0.655 0.133 > 99
(0.841) (0.011) (0.323) (0.186) — —
λ = 0.08 1.234 0.033 0.486 0.588 0.103 > 99
(0.688) (0.008) (0.156) (0.052) — —
ρ = 0.5 1.235 0.023 0.699 0.766 0.067 > 99
(0.721) (0.010) (0.347) (0.242) — —
γ = 0.5 1.315 0.011 0.544 0.641 0.097 > 99
(0.636) (0.009) (0.247) (0.151) — —
Table 4.2: Statistics of the Sample Firms by Simulation
brackets are the corresponding standard deviations. The second and third column
are the value of equity and of managerial rent, respectively. Next, the fourth and fifth
column show the the optimal hedging magnitude for shareholders and the optimal
hedging magnitude for the manager, respectively. In the second column to the right,
∆h = hR−hE denotes the average difference between hE derived from equation (4.11)
and hR derived from equation (4.12). The column very close to the right is the t-
test value for examining the difference between hE and hR. The first row collects
statistics for the base case. The second and third row show the cases when f = 0.95
and λ = 0.08, respectively, and other parameters are equal to the base case. Similarly,
the fourth row demonstrates statistics of the firm with ρ = 0.5, while all the rest of
parameters stay consistent with the base case. Finally, the bottom row shows the
case in which the firm has a non–linear cash compensation scheme for profitable
derivatives.
As Table 4.2 shows, ∆h is statistically and economically significant in all cases,
indicating an apparent conflict of hedging policy choices between the manager and
shareholders. In the base case, the difference between the manager’s optimal hedge
and shareholders’ optimal hedge is estimated at a level of 7.3%, suggesting that
the manager is likely to hedge 40.1% of the firm’s production on average, which is
around 22% more than what shareholders actually want. With lower production cost
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(f = 0.95), the manager will over–hedge around 25% than the optimal hedging ratio
of shareholders. With a higher financial constraint where λ = 0.08, the manager is
over–hedging 10.3% of the production, implying that hR is 21% larger than hE in this
case. These results from simulation support my numerical results and conclusions in
Section 4.4.2.
In the industry where firms have a higher hedging ability (ρ = 0.5), the interests
of the manager and shareholders are better aligned than the base case. When the
optimal choice of hedge of the manager hR is 76.6% of the firm production, which is
around 10% higher than the optimal hedge of shareholder hE = 69.9%. Therefore,
through the simulation in this section, my results and conclusions in Section 4.4.4 are
directly verified.
Finally, with a non–linear cash compensation scheme for profitable derivatives,
the magnitude of the manager’s deviation from the optimal hedge of shareholders is
around 17.8% of hE. It suggests that a linear cash–bonus compensation scheme could
alleviate the conflict of hedging policy between the manager and shareholders, as it
is making the manager less aggressive for taking positions in financial derivatives.
4.5. Conclusions
Ideally, financial hedging strategies set by managers are fully understood by a com-
pany’s shareholders before a hedging program is put in place, and thus nothing should
be compensated for profitable derivatives. However, empirical evidence shows that
material effect of derivative gains on managerial rent. It thus reflects a fact that the
level of sophistication of investors is to be improved. This research predicts a damage
in contract efficiency as a consequence of reward for profitable derivatives.
In this chapter, I analyze the association between the cash compensation for
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derivative earnings and the contract efficiency. I find that, as investors treat the
derivative performance as a measure of firm manager’s financial skill, there is an
effective conflict between firm manager and shareholders in respect of determining
corporate financial hedging policy. I find a V–shaped relation of contracting efficiency
against the price of firm product and the price of the underlying asset of hedging
derivatives. Because the cash compensation for profitable derivatives is the key factor
distorts the manager’s objective function, I conclude that the conflict is essentially
caused by such a managerial incentive scheme under the fair value based accounting
standards for hedge.
Furthermore, I investigate how the contracting efficiency would be influenced
by changing levels of financial constraints facing the firm, the hedging effectiveness of
derivatives, and the concavity of cash compensation scheme. I demonstrate that the
fair value based accounting standards do improve the alignment of the interests of
firm manager and shareholders in some circumstances. Numerical results suggest that
the conflict is alleviated to some extent through higher levels of financial constraints,
stronger hedging abilities, and non–zero concavity of cash reward schemes. In par-
ticular, when the firm’s profitability is above–average, the interests of the manager
and shareholders can be perfectly aligned in the firm with high financial constraint,
or with sufficient hedging ability, or with a non–zero concavity of cash reward.
However, my results also highlight that the conflict is particularly apparent
when the operational profitability of the firm is below–average but not near distress,
regardless of under which circumstances. In this case, the manager would choose to
hedge much less than what shareholders really need. One explanation is that the
manager acts somehow as a debtholder of the firm if there is cash compensation, and
thus the manager is less willing to make investments in financial derivatives when the




The numerical solution of the model is obtained through a dynamic programming
iteration. I use discretization to approximate the continuous state variables, following
Terry and Knotek II (2011) and Tauchen (1986). In particular, I let log θ1,t and log θ2,t
take values from intervals whose center is zero. In each range, 16 points are equally
distributed. The value functions are represented as functions on the grid points.
The expectation is computed using the Gauss–Hermite quadrature method
with n = 11 sample points. In the quadrature method, the Gaussian integral is
















In the numerical solution, the optimal hedge ratio is computed through the
backward deduction using the recursive formulas in Section 4.3. Stationary solutions
are found by iterating the recursive procedure until the errors of the value functions






This thesis thus far presents discussions on several aspects of corporate financial risk
management. Specifically, Chapter 2 analyzes the incentives for derivatives hedging,
Chapter 3 examines the determinants of hedging strategy, and Chapter 4 explores
the association between managerial compensation scheme and contracting efficiency
of corporate hedging decisions.
The major contribution of Chapter 2 is to reconcile some seemingly contrast-
ing notions of the received theories regarding the hedging incentives. The example
model shows that, in equilibrium, hedging could hardly be a convincing signal of the
firm’s quality, if market has no updating process. Further, the dynamic model makes
three testable predictions that may have empirical implications. First, firms with
an under–estimated profitability would have more incentive for hedging, especially
when they obtain favorable profitability shocks, or in the boom market states, and
vice versa. Second, corporate hedging policies are more sensitive to the profitability
shocks and market states than the one predicted by the complete information models.
124
Third, hedging is more sensitive to the belief of outsiders when the firm realizes an
unfavorable profitability shock, or when the market is in recession. The results of
our dynamic model emphasize the importance of information asymmetry on corpo-
rate incentives for financial hedging and provide a possible explanation on the mixed
empirical evidence on corporate hedging policies.
Chapter 3 delves deeper into the reasons for corporate hedging and exhibits
the important explanatory roles played by firm’s profitability, growth opportunity,
and informational asymmetry. The theoretical model of the essay shows that the
attractiveness of hedging to a firm is determined by both the value-enhancing and
the transparency–enhancing potential of hedging. Based on the model predictions,
the empirical study then examines the key model predictions by using hand–collected
panel data on 62 the U.S. oil & gas firms’ derivative usage for hedging commodity
price risk, I find evidence in support of the theoretical model. First, I find a positive
relation between a firm’s profitability and hedging activity. Second, a firm’s hedging
incentive increases with the severity of informational asymmetry but this relation
becomes negative for extremely high-level informational asymmetry. In addition, I
find that informational asymmetry positively interacts with firms profitability. Third,
the relation between growth potential and hedging decision is positive but modest in
economical significance, and the marginal effect is negative. Finally, consistent with
the theory and intuition, I show that a firm with less ability to access derivatives
market is less likely to hedge.
The empirical findings contribute to the empirical risk management literature
by analyzing corporate financial hedging activities of a comprehensive sample of oil
and gas firms. Since the reliability of disclosures on firms’ derivatives fair values
for the purpose of hedging remains doubtful, I investigate only the sample firms’
disclosure on physical hedge ratio or nominal volume of commodity hedged, following
a sizable prior empirical literature, such as Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014)
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and Rampini, Viswanathan, and Vuillemey (2017). The panel structure of the data in
this essay allows me to exploit both cross–sectional and within–firm variation to assess
the relationship between financial hedging and the focused variables. Many previous
studies use only cross–sectional data and hardly exploit within–firm variation because
they largely rely on dummy variables for financial hedging activities that have only
limited within-firm variation.
In Chapter 4, I find that, as investors treat the derivative performance as
a measure of firm manager’s financial skill, there is an effective conflict between
firm manager and shareholders in respect of determining corporate financial hedging
policy. I demonstrate that the fair value based accounting standards do improve the
alignment of the interests of firm manager and shareholders in some circumstances.
Numerical results suggest that the conflict is alleviated to some extent through higher
levels of financial constraints, stronger hedging abilities, and non–linear cash reward
schemes. In particular, when the market price of the product of the firm is above–
average, the interests of the manager and shareholders can be perfectly aligned in
the firm with high financial constraint, or with sufficient hedging ability, or with
a non-zero concavity of cash reward. The essay also highlights that the conflict is
particularly apparent when the operational profitability of the firm is below-average
but not near distress, regardless of under which circumstances.
Chapter 4 makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, my re-
search extends the work DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) by proposing a more practical
managerial incentive scheme. The career contract between the firm and manager in-
cludes both equity–based and cash–based compensation, which makes the objective of
the firm manager differs from the objective of shareholders in respect of the choice of
hedging policy. This has not been previously analyzed. Second, my research provides
theoretical support for empirical works depicting managerial incentive for profitable
derivatives. I capture the conflict between firm manager and shareholders by using a
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dynamic model that relieves the manager from the reputational considerations. Thus,
the results are believed to be persistent. Third, I explore the association between the
cash compensation for fair value based-accounting earnings and contracting efficiency
in different situations respectively. To my best knowledge, my research is the first
that shows that the degree of the conflict varies among different situations.
5.2. Discussions
Findings in this thesis shed lights upon many open research questions. For example,
what difference does financial hedging really make? According to the Modigliani–
Miller irrelevance proposition, since investors can manage financial risks on their own
simply by holding well–diversified portfolios, reductions in the variability of corporate
cash flows achieved by financial risk management can hardly create value. However,
by accomplishing one or more of market frictions, it would enhance the value–adding
effect of financial hedging and induce an incentive for financial risk management, as
suggested by the aforementioned literature. To that extent, the real cost of protecting
against downside losses is that the firm must forgo upside gains. One of the existing
theories exploring such a trade–off is Babenko and Tserlukevich (2017).
Beyond the conventional scope, the model of Chapter 2 of this thesis em-
phasizes the importance of the information effect of financial hedging on external
financing cost and firm value. Empirically, the strategic incentives for financial risk
management deserves more attention. That is, do firms hedge for the purpose other
than reducing convex external frictions? The answer could be yes, but the evidence
is fairly limited as yet.1 One suggestive research is Nain (2004) who argues that a
firm’s need to hedge depends on the extent of hedging in its industry. The author
exhibits that firms choosing not to hedge foreign exchange risk in industries where
1See Aretz and Bartram (2010) for a discussion about the difficulty of measuring the value effect
of financial hedging.
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the use of foreign–exchange derivatives is common had 5% lower Tobin’s Q than their
hedged competitors.
Chapter 4 suggests that managerial compensation scheme could result in a
distortion of hedging incentive and other financial decisions. Gladly, planned future
research focusing on the empirical implications of the model predictions of Chapter 4
is ready for test. One pioneering research is Nikolov and Whited (2014) who use panel
data structurally estimate how managerial compensation scheme affects the dynamic
of corporate cash holdings decisions.
In addition, the results in Chapter 4 raise many questions regarding the effect
of other issues on determining corporate financial hedging policy. Most notably, I do
not consider cash holding, leverage, and taxation. Further normative research into
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Stulz, René M, 1984, Optimal hedging policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 19, 127–140.
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